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Summary:
This Article addresses a long-unresolved issue in criminal and
constitutional law: Does the Fifth Amendment provide any protection
against compelled production of incriminatingpersonal documents in the
possession of an individual who is a subject or target of a criminal
investigation? The Supreme Court has not definitively addressed this
important question, and the case law reflects deep disagreement on an
issue of great significance to criminal law enforcement. The issue has
been unresolved since 1976, when the Supreme Court redefined the scope
of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in Fisher v.
United States and held that the privilege does not bar compelled
production of incriminating documents. This Article examines the
development of the law up to and since Fisher, and concludes that the
Supreme Court's 2000 decision in United States v. Hubbell has, at least
in practical effect, diminished the impact of Fisher and restored Fifth
Amendment protection to many private papers in the possession of
individuals. This Article analyzes the likely impact of the Hubbell
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decision on criminal law enforcement and concludes that after Hubbell
prosecutors in many cases may be more likely to use search warrants,
rather than subpoenas, to obtain personal documents from individuals
who are subjects or targets of an investigation-if,that is, they can satisfy
the Fourth Amendment's particularity and probable cause requirements.
If prosecutors cannot satisfy these FourthAmendment requirements, then
after Hubbell they no longer can be confident that they can compel the
production of private papers by subpoena and immunity grant and
subsequently use the contents of those papers to prosecute the individual
who produced them. These changes flow directly from the Hubbell
decision, and they represent a major "power shift" from prosecutors to
defense counsel in white collar criminalinvestigations and prosecutions.
I.
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Introduction

190

In 1976, the United States Supreme Court dropped a bombshell'
on the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination with its decision

1 "Bombshell" is a strong word, but it does not overstate the significance of the Fisher
decision. Professor Mosteller has said, "The Fisher decision represented a major watershed,
signaling a fundamental departure from earlier fifth amendment doctrines." Robert P. Mosteller,
Simplifing Subpoena Law: Taking the Fifth Amendment Seriously, 73 VA. L. Ray. 1, 3 (1987); see
also Mitchell Lewis Rothman, Life After Doe? Self-Incrimination and Business Documents, 56 U.
CIN. L. REV. 387, 387 (1987); Stan Krauss, Note, The Life and Times of Boyd v. United States
(1886-1976), 76 Mict. L. Rav. 184, 206-07 (1977); Note, The Rights of CriminalDefendants and
the Subpoena Duces Tecum: The Aftermath of Fisher v. United States, 95 HARv. L. REV. 683, 694702 (1982). The Supreme Court itself subsequently acknowledged that "the holding in Fisher...
embarked upon a new course of Fifth Amendment analysis." Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99,
109 (1988). The principal question posed by this Article is whether that "new course" has been
circular, ultimately bringing Fifth Amendment law back to a position very near pre-Fisherprinciples.
After United States v. Hubbell, it appears that in significant respects the Court's course has indeed
been circular and Fisher's impact has been largely nullified, at least when an individual's private
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in Fisher v. United States.2 Fisher held that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination is not a bar to the compelled

production of incriminating documents-and, therefore, an individual3 can
be forced to produce incriminating private papers-because the prior,
voluntary creation of the documents "was not 'compelled' within the
meaning of the privilege." 4 This holding came to be understood as
having effectively eliminated Fifth Amendment protection for the

contents5 of previously created documents, arguably even the most private
or most incriminating personal documents, such as a diary or a personal
journal. 6
Over the past twenty-five years, the holding of Fisher has been
construed more and more broadly, 7 to the point that the conventional
papers are sought by the government and the government does not have prior knowledge of the
existence, location, and authenticity of those papers.
2 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
3 The Supreme Court treats corporations and other collective entities, such as partnerships,
differently from individuals under the Fifth Amendment, applying the "collective entity" rule. See,
e.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974) (partnerships); United States v. White, 322 U.S.
694 (1944) (labor unions); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (corporations). See generally
Mosteller, supra note 1, at 49-86 (analyzing "the artificial entities exception" to the Fifth
Amendment). The development of the collective entity doctrine is described at infra Part H.A.2.
4 See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35-36 (2000) (referring to Fisher, 425 U.S. at
414).
5 As explained by the Fisher Court and discussed in more detail below, the information
contained in the documents must be distinguished from the information that may be conveyed by the
act of producing the documents. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 ("The act of producing evidence in
response to a subpoena nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the
contents of the papers produced. Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the
papers demanded and their possession or control by the taxpayer. It also would indicate the
taxpayer's belief that the papers are those described in the subpoena."); see also Baltimore City
Dep't. of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 555 (1990) ("The Fifth Amendment's protection
may nonetheless be implicated because the act of complying with the government's demand testifies
to the existence, possession, or authenticity of the things produced."); In re Hyde, 235 B.R. 539, 543
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("Even if the contents of documents are not privileged, however, the act of
producing those documents might be."); Barbara Daniels Davis, Note, The Fifth Amendment and
Production of Documents after United States v. Doe, 66 B.U.L. REv. 95, 114 (1986); Christopher
M. Marston et al., Procedural Issues, 37 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 819, 829 (2000). For further
discussion of this point, see infra Part I.B.
6 See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 618 (1984) (Marshall, J. and Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) [hereinafter Doe 1]; In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum Dated October 29, 1992, 1 F.3d 87, 91-93 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Steinberg, 837 F.2d 527,
528-29 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Katin, 109 F.R.D. 406, 407-08 (Mass. 1986). As one
commentator has observed, "The reasoning of [Fisherand Doe 1] suggests that this rule applies even
to private documents such as diaries and correspondence, thereby largely burying the notion that the
fifth amendment protects against compelled intrusion into individuals' thoughts and views." William
J. Stuntz, Self-incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1227, 1277 (1988); see also Daniel E.
Will, Note, "DearDiary-Canyou be used againstme?": The Fifth Amendment and Diaries, 35 B.C.
L. REv. 965 (1994) (describing the judicially compelled production of Senator Bob Packwood's
personal diaries to the Senate Select Committee on Ethics).
7 See United States v. Schlansky, 709 F.2d 1079, 1082 (6th Cir. 1983); Richard A. Nagareda,
Compulsion "to be a witness" and the Resurrectionof Boyd, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1575 (1999); David
S. Rudolf & Thomas K. Maher, Behind Closed Doors: Hubbell's Ongoing Saga:Metaphysics of the
Fifth Amendment-Independent Counsel's Jurisdiction,THE CHAMPION, April 1999, at 44.
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wisdom in white collar criminal investigations is that most documents are

not within the protections of the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.' Documents are routinely produced to grand juries by
individuals who are subjects or targets of the grand jury's investigation in

response to subpoenas duces tecum 9 without any assertion of Fifth
Amendment privilege-whether as to the contents of the documents or the
act of producing the documents.' 0 This is particularly true with regard to

individuals' business and financial records, which often are not perceived
as being sufficiently private or personal to implicate Fifth Amendment
protection. " Throughout the post-Fisher period, however, one critical
question has remained unanswered: Are there any documents that are so

private, so personal, that the Fifth Amendment would shield them from
compelled production? 2
This difficult question provoked a confrontation between Justice
O'Connor, on the one hand, and Justices Marshall and Brennan, on the
other hand, in dueling concurring opinions in United States v. Doe, 3 the14
1984 decision that "reexamined and reaffirmed Fisher'snew approach"

to Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. In her Doe concurring opinion
Justice O'Connor took the firm position that "the Fifth Amendment
provides absolutely no protection for the contents of private papers of any
8 See Mosteller, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that "the modem view [is] that the fifth amendment
provides only limited protection for documents"); see also Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Documents and the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 27, 49 (1986) ("On the whole, Fisher
conveys the impression that even without immunity the act of production generally would not block
access to the unprivileged contents of preexisting documents."); c.. Suntz, supra note 6, at 1233
n.13 ("Nothing in the Court's analysis in those cases [Fisher and Doe] leaves room for any fifth
amendment protection for the substance of private documents."). Compare SARA S. BEALE Er AL.,
GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACrICE § 6:15, at 6-113 (2d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2000) ("[A] subpoena for a
sole proprietor's bank account records can hardly raise serious questions about the existence of the
records and the sole proprietor's possession of them.").
9 A subpoena duces tecum requires "the person to whom it is directed to produce the books,
papers, documents or other objects designated therein." FED. R. CRIM. P. 17 (c).
10 See supra note 5; see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW,
CRIMINAL ANTITRUST LITIGATION MANUAL 95 (1983) (observing that most document subpoenas are
not contested and of those that are, most are resolved by negotiations with the prosecution).
11 See United States v. Fishman, 726 F.2d 125, 126-27 (4th Cir. 1983); Robert Johnston et al.,
ProceduralIssues, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 983 (1999); Arthur Y.D. Ong, Fifth Amendment Privilege
and Compelled Production of Corporate Papers After Fisher and Doe, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 935
(1986); William J. Stuntz, Privacy'sProblem and the Lav of CriminalProcedure, 93 MICH. L. REV.
1016 (1995).
12 See, e.g., Alito, supra note 8, at 39 ("Certain intimate personal documents-a diary is the
best example-are like an extension of the individual's mind.... Forcing an individual to give up
possession of these intimate writings may be psychologically comparable to prying words from his
lips.") (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 420 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). For an
elaboration of this point, see Craig M. Bradley, Constitutional Protectionfor Private Papers, 16
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 461 (1981). Compare Robert S. Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd: SelfIncriminationand Private Papersin the Burger Court, 27 UCLA L. REV. 343, 361 (1979)).
13 United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 618-619 (1984) (O'Connor, J. concurring and
Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) [hereinafter Doe 1].
14 Alito, supra note 8, at 29.
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kind. "'15 This statement drew a strong protest from Justices Marshall and
Brennan, who argued that Doe did not support Justice O'Connor's broad
conclusion, in part because the case involved "business records which
implicate a lesser degree of concern for privacy interests than, for
example, personal diaries." 16 No other member of the Court joined

Justice O'Connor's opinion, but since Doe, most of the federal courts of
appeals have followed her lead and concluded that the Fifth Amendment

does not protect the contents of private papers. 17
In the post-Fisher era, another truism concerning the compelled
production of documents has come to be widely accepted by both
prosecutors and criminal defense lawyers. In grand jury investigations of
white-collar crime, prosecutors rely heavily on grand jury subpoenas

duces tecum as their primary means of obtaining documentary evidence.'"
Subpoenas are used much more frequently than search warrants, which

generally are used only when prosecutors fear destruction of documents if
a subpoena is used or have reason to believe that a subpoenaed party will
not comply fully with a subpoena. "9 Absent such circumstances,
prosecutors prefer subpoenas to search warrants, and for good reason. In
the federal system, subpoenas can be issued by prosecutors without
judicial review or approval,2" and grand jury subpoenas for documents
need not satisfy the Fourth Amendment particularity and probable cause
15 Doe 1, 465 U.S. at 618.
16 Id. at 619.
17 See Barrett v. Acevedo, 169 F.3d 1155, 1168 (8th Cir. 1999); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d. Cir. 1993); United States v. Wujkowski, 929 F.2d 981, 983, 985
(4th Cir. 1991) (contents of appointment books and records relating to vacation home not privileged
under Fifth Amendment); In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 83, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (privilege "does not
cover the contents of any voluntarily prepared records, including personal ones"); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 759 F.2d 1418, 1419 (9th Cir. 1985) (contents of business and personal documents are
not privileged "in the absence of some showing that creation of the documents was the product of
compulsion"). But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 55 F.3d 1012, 1013-14 (5th Cir. 1995); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 632 F.2d 1033, 1043 (3d Cir. 1980) (both holding that the contents of
personal papers remain privileged in certain circumstances).
18 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Commentary: O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the
Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REv. 842, 857 (2001) ("Like most white-collar
criminal investigations, the inquiry into Clinton's misdeeds involved the heavy use of subpoenas, not
searches."); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated April 9, 1996 (FGJ 96-02), 87 F.3d 1198
(11th Cir. 1996); Peter J. Henning, Defense Discovery in White Collar Criminal Prosecutions, 15
GA. ST. U. L. REv. 601, 606 (1999); cf. United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1349 (11th
Cir. 1982) ("[E]ffective investigation of complex white-collar crimes may require the assembly of a
'paper puzzle' from a large number of seemingly innocuous pieces of individual evidence . . .
[hence,] reading the warrant with practical flexibility entails an awareness of the difficulty of piecing
together the 'paper puzzle.'").
19 See Citicasters v. McCaskill, 89 F.3d 1350, 1354-55 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Peter J.
Henning, Testing the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting White Collar Crime: How Far Will the
CourtsAllow Prosecutorsto Go?, 54 U. PiTT. L. REv. 405, 413-14 (1993).
20 See BEALE ET AL., supra note 8, § 6:2; see also Stern v. United States Dist. Court, 214
F.3d 4, 19 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that prior judicial review is not required); Henning, supra note 19,
at 413.
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requirements that apply to search warrants.21 This state of affairs has led
to a general acceptance, by both prosecutors and defense lawyers, that it

is easier for federal prosecutors to obtain documents by subpoena than by
obtaining and executing a search warrant.'
Both of these assumptions-that the contents of pre-existing

documents generally are not protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and that subpoenas are the easiest and best way

for prosecutors to obtain documentary evidence-are widely accepted
today. This Article takes the position that when private documents in the
possession of an individual are sought by the government, neither of these
assumptions necessarily remains valid after the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Hubbell.' As explained below, the Hubbell decision

effectively, if not explicitly, overruled Fisher in cases where prosecutors
are seeking private documents from an individual.

After Hubbell,

prosecutors no longer can use a grand jury subpoena duces tecum and a
grant of "act of production immunity" to compel production of documents
by an individual who is a subject or targee 4 of a grand jury investigation

without risking the loss of their ability to prosecute that individual.

21 See BE.ALE t T AL., supra note 8, § 6:20. See generally United States v. R. Enterprises,
Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991) (discussing the reasonableness requirement of subpoenas and holding
that a court should strike down a subpoena only if "there is no reasonable possibility that the category
of materials the Government seeks will produce information relevant to the general subject of the
grand jury's investigation"); Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1946).
The application of the Fourth Amendment to document subpoenas is discussed further at infra Part
IV. A.
22 See generally Doe v. United States (In re Admin. Subpoena), 270 F.3d 413 (6th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Bailey (In re Subpoena Duces Tecum), 228 F.3d 341, 347 (4th Cir. 2000); Gabriel
L. Imperato, Internal Investigations, Government Investigations, Whistleblower Concerns:
Techniques to Protect Your Health Care Organization,51 ALA. L. RV. 205, 227 (1999); Nagareda,
supranote 7, at 1631.
23 530 U.S. 27 (2000). Other commentators have recognized the potential significance of the
Hubbell decision. Professor Stuntz has noted that the holding of Fisher "may have been largely
(albeit tacitly) overruled by [Hubbell]." See Stuntz, supra note 18, at 859 n.65. Professor Uviller
has gone further, concluding that Hubbell rejected the "correct" understanding of Fisherand "comes
dangerously close" to restoring Fifth Amendment protection to the contents of voluntarily produced
personal documents. See H. Richard Uviller, Foreward: Fisher Goes on the QuintessentialFishing
Expedition and Hubbell is Off the Hook, 91 1. CluM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 311, 335 (2001). This
Article takes a different approach. It accepts the underlying premise that Hubbell is inconsistent with
Fisher, but concludes that Hubbell was correctly decided and provides much-needed guidance in the
application of the Fifth Amendment to document subpoenas. It goes on to analyze that guidance and
explore its implications for the criminal justice system.
24 The Department of Justice United States Attorneys' Manual defines a "target" of a grand
jury investigation as "a person as to whom the prosecutor or the grand jury has substantial evidence
linking him or her to the commission of a crime and who, in the judgment of the prosecutor, is a
putative defendant" and a "subject" of a grand jury investigation as "a person whose conduct is
within the scope of the grand jury's investigation." USAM § 9-11.151 (1999).
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Therefore, contrary to conventional wisdom, after Hubbell,
prosecutors in many cases may be better off using search warrants to
obtain personal documents from individuals who are subjects or targets of
an investigation-if, that is, they can satisfy the Fourth Amendment's
particularity' and probable cause26 requirements. If prosecutors cannot
satisfy these Fourth Amendment requirements, then after Hubbell they
cannot use the contents of truly private, personal documents in a
prosecution of the individual whom they compel to produce the
documents. These changes flow directly from the Hubbell decision, and
they represent a major "power shift" from prosecutors to defense counsel
in white-collar criminal investigations and prosecutions. This Article
analyzes each of these important consequences of the Hubbell decision.
Part I of this Article describes Fifth Amendment jurisprudence on
compelled production of documents through the Supreme Court's decision
in Fisherv. United States and its progeny. Part II discusses the impact of
the Hubbell case on Fifth Amendment doctrine, analyzing the opinions of
both the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
Part III compares grand jury subpoenas and search warrants as means of
obtaining documentary evidence in the post-Hubbell era, discussing "act
of production" immunity and the application of Fourth Amendment
particularity and probable cause requirements to search and seizure of
private documents. Part IV argues that, after Hubbell, prosecutors no
longer can count on using "act of production" immunity to compel
production of private documents from an individual and subsequently use
those documents in a criminal prosecution of that individual. To obtain
and lawfully use such documents in a criminal prosecution, the
government must either (i) use a search warrant and comply with Fourth
Amendment particularity and probable cause requirements, or (ii) be able
to demonstrate that the prosecution possessed essentially the same level of
knowledge about the documents in question-in other words, sufficient
information to meet the Fouth Amendment particularity requirementprior to granting immunity and compelling an individual to produce the
documents. In its Conclusion, this Article asserts that Hubbell has, for
practical purposes, overruled Fisher and restored full and meaningful (as
25 See generally Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987); Caroline J. Hinga, TwentyNinth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure:Introduction and Guide for Users: L Investigation and
Police Practices: The Warrant Requirement, 88 GEO. L.J. 895, 900 (2000); David A. Kessler,
Illusion of Privacy: The Use and Abuse of Ex Pane Impoundment in Computer Software Copyright
Cases, 7 ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH. 269, 285 (1997).
26 See generally Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); Chad R. Bowman, Thirtieth
Annual Review of CriminalProcedure:Introduction and Guidefor Users: L Investigationand Police
Practices: The Warrant Requirement, 89 GEo. L.. 1068, 1068 (2001); Brett R. Hamn, United
States v. Hotal: Determining the Role of ConditionsPrecedentin the Constitutionalityof Anticipatory
Warrants, 1999 BYU L. REv. 1005, 1012 (1999).
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opposed to mere "physical act of production") Fifth Amendment
protection to truly private documents that are in the possession of an
individual who is the subject or target of a criminal investigation.

II.

The Fifth Amendment, Compelled Production of Documents, and
the Development of the Act of Production Doctrine.

A.

Fisher'sFifth Amendment Antecedents.
The privilege against self-incrimination is based upon the Fifth

Amendment requirement that "no person. .. shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." 7 Although the Fifth
Amendment was ratified in 1791, a defendant did not have the advantage
of the full modem privilege against self-incrimination in federal cases
until 1878.2" Surprisingly, the United States Supreme Court did not
address the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment until 1886
in Boyd v. United States.29
1.

Boyd v. United States and its Aftermath

Boyd is the seminal case applying the Fifth Amendment to
compelled production of documents and, as discussed below, much of

what has followed Boyd has been written in response (or in opposition) to
the holding in that case.3" In Boyd, the United States initiated a forfeiture
proceeding for thirty-five cases of plate glass that the government claimed

27 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
28 A defendant was not permitted to offer sworn testimony in federal criminal trials until 1878.
Act of March 16, 1878, ch. 37, 20 stat. 30 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (2001)) (also does not
allow presumption against defendant for failure to testify). See also Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B.
Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REv. 857,
891 n.153 (1995) ("Defendants were not allowed to testify under oath at trial in America until the
midnineteenth century.") (emphasis in original) (citing Joel N. Bodansky, The Abolition of the PartyWitness Disqualification: An HistoricalSurvey, 70 KY. L.J. 91 (1892)); Nagareda, supra note 7, at
1616-17 (explaining that the common law rule of evidence disqualifying persons with an interest in
the case being tried from providing testimony prevented a witness from testifying at his own criminal
trial).
29 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Alito, supra note 8, at 39 ("Boyd was also the Supreme Court's first
significant case involving the fourth amendment or the fifth amendment privilege.") (citation
omitted). Professor Nagareda has identified dictum in an earlier case, United States v. Reyburn, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 352 (1832), as an antecedent to Boyd. See Nagareda, supra note 7, at 1584-85
(discussing the statement in Reyburn that a potential prosecution witness "could not have been
compelled to produce the [document], and thereby furnish evidence against himself").
30 See Nagareda, supra note 7, at 1592-94 (discussing the Supreme Court's subsequent
departure from the holding in Boyd); see also Krauss, supra note 1, at 4 (describing the erosion of
Boyd).
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had been imported by the Boyd firm without payment of customs duties.3'
At trial,32 the government offered into evidence an invoice that the Boyd
firm had been ordered by the court to produce.33 The court's order was
based on authority granted by a statute that treated a failure to produce
the documents as a confession of the charges by the government.3 ' Faced
with this draconian penalty, the Boyd firm had complied with the court

order under protest, claiming that this compelled production of
documentary evidence was unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the compulsory
production of private business records3 6 violated the Fifth Amendment.37
The Court also held that the court order violated the Fourth Amendment
because the compulsory production was the equivalent of an
unreasonable 38 search and seizure. 39 Although the majority opinion in
Boyd relied upon both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in holding that
the statute was unconstitutional, 4" Justice Miller's concurring opinion
asserted that the Fifth Amendment alone was adequate grounds to strike
down the statute. 4
31 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617-19. For further explanations of the facts of Boyd, see Alito, supra
note 8, at 31-35 (referencing the briefs fied in the case); Nagareda, supra note 7, at 1584-87
(emphasizing the Boyd Court's reliance on the legislative history of the statute authorizing the court
order compelling production of the documents sought by the government); Mosteller, supra note 1, at
51; Rothman, supra note 1, at 184.
32 The jury entered a verdict against Boyd and the cases of glass were seized. See Boyd, 116
U.S. at 618.
33 Boyd objected to the validity of the order and to the constitutionality of the law prescribing
the order. Id.
34 Id. at 620; see also Alito, supra note 8, at 31-32 (1986) (describing the history of the
statute).
35 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 620; see also Krauss, supra note 1, at 184-85 ("The Boyds complied
under protest, arguing that both the order and the statute authorizing it were unconstitutional.").
36 The Court did not distinguish Boyd's records as being business records; it simply
characterized them as private papers and books. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623-24, 632-34.
37 See id. at 634-35.
38 "'[-0nreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in the Fourth Amendment are almost
always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself. . . ." Id. at 633.
39 Id. at 634-35; see also Krauss, supra note 1, at 185 n.10.
40 This fact has received much criticism. See, e.g., Alito, supra note 8, at 36; Henry J.
Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L.
REV. 671, 682 (1968). Professor Nagareda has criticized Justice Bradley's majority opinion for
"conflating the Fourth and Fifth Amendments."
Nagareda, supra note 7, at 585. Another
commentator has described "Boyd's confusion of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments." Alito, supra
note 8, at 35.
41 "Mhe order of the court under the statute is in effect a subpoena duces tecum, and, though
the penalty for the witness's failure to appear in court with the criminating papers is not fine and
imprisonment, it is one.., of a criminal nature. . . . That this is within the protection which the
Constitution intended against compelling a person to be a witness against himself, is, I think, quite
clear." Boyd, 116 U.S. at 639 (Miller, I., concurring). Professor Nagareda has sought to "resurrect
the Fifth Amendment holding of Boyd" by arguing that the Fifth Amendment protects against any
compelled production of self-incriminatory evidence-testimonial, documentary, or physical. See
Nagareda, supra note 7, at 1590. Two members of the United States Supreme Court have expressed
their agreement with Professor Nagareda. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 49-56 (2000)
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Boyd has been praised'as standing for protection of private papers

from government subpoena or seizure, 42 but its Fourth Amendment
holding has been rejected as based on an ill-conceived property rights
A series of Supreme Court cases eroded Boyd's
rationale. '4

constitutional holding to the point that one commentator pronounced Boyd
"dead" after the Supreme Court's Fisher decision. 4 This judicial
abandonment of Boyd has been analyzed elsewhere, 4 ' so the following

discussion focuses on the line of decisions addressing the Fifth
Amendment's application to the production of documents that culminated
in the Court's landmark ruling in Fisher.
2.

The Collective Entity Cases.

Boyd's conception of the Fifth Amendment as protecting against
compelled production of potentially incriminating documents was
weakened by a series of cases in which the Supreme Court analyzed

document subpoenas directed to corporations and other collective entities.
In Hale v. Henkel,46 one of the questions before the Court47 was whether a
corporate official could refuse to produce corporate docments48 called
for by a subpoena duces tecum when the officer had been granted

immunity from prosecution. 49 The Court held that if immunity has been
granted to a corporate officer, then that individual can be compelled to
testify and to comply with a subpoena for corporate documents,5" because
the right of an individual to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination

5

only extends to the individual himself, 52 and a

(Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, concurring). Professor Uviller has questioned whether
other Justices will follow down a path that, in his view, would require overruling Schrmerber. See
Uviller, supra note 23, at 324.
42 See, e.g., Alit, supranote 8,at 35-36.
43 See id.; see also Mosteller, supra note 1, 51-52 (analyzing Boyd as based on concerns for
protection of private property rather than personal privacy); Nagareda, supra note 7, at 1587-89
(identifying shortcomings of the Court's Fourth Amendment Holding).
44 See Krauss, supra note 1, at 211.
45 See, e.g., id. at 185 n.10; Mosteller, supra note 1, at 51-59 (tracing the doctrinal
development from Boyd to Fisher); Alito, supra note 8, at 35-41 (describing the "undermining" of
Boyd); Robert Heidt, The Fifth Amendment Privilege and Documents-Cutfing Fisher's TangledLine,
49 Mo. L. RPv. 439, 444-70 (1984) (describing case law from Boyd to Fisher).
46 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
47 The Fourth Amendment aspects of Hale v. Henkel are discussed at infra Part W.A.
48 The case arose out of a grand jury investigation of corporate antitrust violations. See Hale,
201 U.S. at 64, 76-77.
49 Id. at 58.
50 ld. at 70.
51 The Court reasoned that the privilege against self-incrimination only applies to testimony
that possibly exposes the witness to criminal charges, and it cannot be invoked if the testimony will
only impair his reputation or disgrace him, if the testimony relates to past criminal acts for which the
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corporation cannot assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-

incrimination.53 The Court based its conclusion that a corporation cannot
assert a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination on the fact
that a corporation "is a creature of the State" and, therefore, the State
should be able to investigate
whether the corporation exceeded the powers
54
State.
the
by
it
to
granted
The Supreme Court built upon its Hale decision five years later
when it decided Wilson v. United States.55 In Wilson, a corporation was
served with a subpoena duces tecum requiring production of corporate
documents56 in connection with a grand jury investigation 7 of officers58 of
the corporation for possible criminal offenses.5 9 Wilson, who was the
president of the corporation, refused to produce the subpoenaed corporate

documents,' claiming that he was using them to prepare his defense and
that their contents would tend to incriminate him.6

The Court rejected

Wilson's arguments' and held that a corporate officer cannot refuse to
turn over corporate documents even if the inquiry of the grand jury that
issued the subpoena is focused on the officer personally and not on the
corporation. 63 The Court, relying upon its holding in Hale that a

corporation has no privilege against self-incrimination, ' stated that it
would be an "unjustifiable extension" of personal rights to permit Wilson

statute of limitations has run, or if the testimony relates to acts for which he has received a pardon or
has been granted immunity. See id. at 66-67.
52 Id. at 69. The Court emphasized that to permit otherwise would be "to put a stop to the
examination of every witness who was called upon to testify before the grand jury with regard to the
doings or business of his principal, whether such principal were an individual or a corporation." Id.
at 70.
53 Id. at 74-75.
54 Id.
55 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
56 The subpoena called for the production of any of the corporation's letter press copy books
that contained copies of correspondence signed by the president of the corporation during the months
of May and June 1909. See id. at 368.
57 See id. at 367-68.
58 Indictments had been filed against the president, certain other officers, directors, and
stockholders of the corporation. See id. at 367.
59 The indictments charged the targets with one count of mail fraud and one count of
conspiracy to commit mail fraud. See id.
60 Wilson claimed that, in addition to business correspondence, the documents contained
copies of his personal and other correspondence; that the documents were in his possession, custody,
and control as against other officers of the corporation; and that the documents contained information
that would tend to incriminate him. See id. at 368-69.
61 See id. at 369.
62 In addition to arguing that compelling him to turn over the documents violated his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Wilson argued that it violated the Sixth Amendment
witness confrontation privilege and the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable search
and seizure. See id. at 375-76.
63 See id. at 384-85.
64 See id. at 383-84 (citing Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43).
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to assert his personal Fifth Amendment right in opposing the production
of corporate documents when the corporation can assert no such right.'
In 1944, the Court further limited the application of the Fifth

Amendment to collective entities. As noted above, Hale had relied upon
a "creature of the State" rationale in concluding that a corporation should
not be able to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.66 This rationale was abandoned when the Court held, in
United States v. White,61 that an unincorporated labor union could not
assert the privilege against self-incrimination. 8 To support this holding

the Court formulated a new test for when an organization should be
precluded from asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. The test announced by the Court was:
whether one can fairly say under all the circumstances that a
particular type of organization has a character so impersonal in
the scope of its membership and activities that it cannot be said
to embody or represent the purely private or personal interest
of its constituents, but rather to embody their common or group
interests only.69

If an organization met this test it could not assert the privilege against
self-incrimination.
Applying its new test, the White Court determined that a labor
union cannot assert a Fifth Amendment privilege and, therefore, a union
official ° could not refuse to produce union documents7' even though they
65 Id. at 385.
66 See Hale, 201 U.S. at 75 ("It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a State, having
chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not in the exercise of its sovereignty
inquire how those franchises had been employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand the
production of the corporate books and records for that purpose.") The Court was not deterred by the
fact that the corporation in Hale, like most corporations, was chartered by a state (New Jersey) and
the investigation was being conducted by a federal grand jury. See id. ("Being subject to this dual
sovereignty, the General Government possesses the same right to see that its own laws are respected
as the State would have with respect to the special franchises vested in it by the laws of the State.").
67 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
68 See id. at 700-01. The Court subsequently characterized the rationale of Wilson as the
"visitorial powers doctrine." See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 92 (1974). In Bellis, the
Court recast the visitorial powers doctrine as "a recognition that corporate records do not contain the
requisite element of privacy or confidentiality essential for the privilege to attach." See id. This
recharacterization reflects the inadequacy of the visitorial powers doctrine to justify withholding the
privilege from collective entities that are not chartered by the State. Ultimately even the "privacy or
confidentiality" rationale fell by the wayside, when the Fisher decision shifted the focus of Fifth
Amendment analysis from privacy to the compulsion of "testimonial" communications. See infra
Part I.A.3.
69 White, 322 U.S. at 701.
70 White described himself as an "assistant supervisor" of the union. Id. at 695.
71 Although White possessed the requested union documents, he was not the authorized
custodian of the requested documents. Id.
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might incriminate him. ' The Court stopped short of denying an
individual a Fifth Amendment right for personal documents, however,
noting that the privilege against self-incrimination is a personal one
"designed to prevent the use of legal process to force [an individual] to
produce and authenticate any personal documents or effects that might

incriminate him."

13

Thus the Court continued to view the Fifth

Amendment privilege as "protect[ing] the individual from any disclosure,

in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattel, sought by legal
process against him as a witness" 74 and continued to rely upon Boyd. 75
Nonetheless, the cumulative effect of Hale, Wilson, and White erased

Boyd's Fifth Amendment holding for collective entities.76
Any doubts about the continued vitality of Boyd's underlying
premise that a collective entity can assert the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination were dispelled by the Supreme Court in its 1974
decision in Bellis v. United States.77 Bellis held that a partner in a
business partnership 7 8 cannot invoke the privilege in response to a
72 The White Court cited Hale and Wilson as establishing that the privilege against selfincrimination is not available to corporations and therefore corporate officials cannot assert the
privilege against self-incrimination when responding to a subpoena duces tecum for corporate
documents even though the corporate documents might incriminate the officials personally. Id. at
699-700.
73 Id. at 698. White made no claim that any part of the subpoenaed union documents consisted
of his own private papers. Id. at 704.
74 Id. at 699.
75 The Court cited Boyd for the proposition that "the papers and effects which the [Fifth
Amendment] privilege protects must be the private property of the person claiming the privilege, or
at least in his possession in a purely personal capacity." See id.
76 In 1957, the Court did recognized one significant limitation on the government's ability to
require individual witnesses to provide information about documents subpoenaed from collective
entities. In Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957), the Court held that, absent a grant of
immunity, a custodian of documents cannot be compelled to provide oral testimony regarding his
refusal to produce subpoenaed entity documents. Id. at 123-24. The Court differentiated between
compelling a custodian to give oral testimony regarding the identification of the produced documents
of an artificial entity and compelling him to give oral testimony regarding the whereabouts of
documents that he had refused to produce. See id. at 125. While the Court conceded that requiring
the custodian to identify the documents would authenticate the documents, it stated that this "merely
makes explicit what is implicit in the production itself" and that "the custodian is subjected to little, if
any, further danger of incrimination." Id. Compelling the custodian to testify regarding the
whereabouts of the unproduced documents, in contrast, would provide evidence against the witness
that would support a charge of criminal contempt, which would be a direct violation of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See id. at 124. The Court also reiterated that in
order for a witness to make a showing of possible incrimination "it need only be evident from the
implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the
question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious
disclosure could result." Id. at 121 n.2 (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87
(1951)).
77 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
78 The partnership at issue was a small law partnership that dissolved when Bellis left the firm,
although the partnership was still "winding up its affairs" when the subpoena was served. Id. at 86.
Under the applicable Pennsylvania law a partnership was not terminated "until the winding up of
partnership affairs [was] completed." Id. at 96 n.3 (citing PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 59, § 92 (1964)).
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subpoena duces tecum for partnership business records. 9 Writing for the
majority, Justice Marshall reasoned that a partnership is not a natural
person 0 and that a partner in a partnership had no expectation of privacy
with respect to the financial records of an organized entity such as his
partnership.8 1

Bellis applied the White test to a small, three-member partnership
and in doing so acknowledged that the White test was "not particularly

helpful" in assessing the application of the Fifth Amendment to small
collective entities that embodied both group interests and the personal
interests of members.82 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the small 3

Bellis partnership met the White test 84 because it had "an established
institutional identity independent of its individual partners." 5 The Court
also concluded that the financial records of the partnership were the
property of the partnership, not an individual partner,86 and Bellis was

holding the records in a representative capacity, not in his individual
capacity. 87 As a separate collective entity, the partnership could not

79 See Bellis, 417 U.S. at 85-86.
80 Justice Marshall cited to previous Supreme Court decisions that had uniformly held that the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects "only the natural individual from compulsory
incrimination through his own testimony or personal records." Id. at 89-90 (quoting White, 322 U.S.
at 701). The Court's focus on the rights of individuals was accompanied by a concern regarding law
enforcement against large collective entities. As Justice Marshall observed, "The framers of the
constitutional guarantee against compulsory self-disclosure, who were interested primarily in
protecting individual civil liberties, cannot be said to have intended the privilege to be available to
protect economic or other interests of such organizations so as to nullify appropriate governmental
regulations." Bellis, 417 U.S. at 91 (quoting White, 322 U.S. at 700).
81 See Bettis, 417 U.S. at 90-91. The Bellis Court relied upon "privacy or confidentiality" as
a policy interest protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See id. at 9192.
82 See id. at 100.
83 Bellis had emphasized language in White suggesting that the test for applicability of the Fifth
Amendment is whether an organization "has a character so impersonal in the scope of its membership
and activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely private or personal interests of
its constituents, but rather to embody their common or group interests only." Id. at 100 (quoting
White, 322 U.S. at 701). The Court rejected the argument that the White test "can be reduced to a
simple proposition based solely upon the size of the organization. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 100.
84 The Bellis Court restated the White test applicable to an organization as a separate entity,
independent of its members, if the organization is "relatively well organized and structured...
maintains a distinct set of organizational records... recognizes rights in its members of control and
access to [its records and] the records subpoenaed must in fact be organizational records held in a
representative capacity." Id. at 92-93.
85 Id. at 95.
86 Justice Marshall wrote that Bellis had no reasonable expectation of privacy with regards to
the partnership records since the partnership was an organized, regulated entity and Bellis, even if he
was the custodian of the partnership records, had no right to keep the other partners from examining
the records. See id. at 92. The Court acknowledged that a different case would be presented if Bellis
had been ordered to produce files that contained work he had personally done on behalf of his clients,
even if those files
might for some purposes be viewed as those of the partnership. See id. at 98 n.9.
87 See id. at 97-99.
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assert a Fifth Amendment privilege, 8 and neither could Bellis as a
custodian of the partnership records holding those records in a
representative capacity. 8 9
In one respect, the holding in Bellis was difficult to reconcile with
Boyd; both cases involved compulsory production of documents by a
partnership, as Justice Marshall acknowledged in a footnote to his Bellis
opinion.' He downplayed the importance of this similarity between the
two cases by noting that in Boyd, "the potential significance of this fact
was not observed by either the parties or the Court."'91 The Boyd Court
did not consider whether the documents at issue in that case "might be a
partnership record held in a representative capacity, and thus not within
the scope of the privilege," and, therefore, did not decide the issue that
was before the Bellis Court.' 2 Thus Justice Marshall was able to dismiss
Boyd as precedent relevant to the Fifth Amendment issue in Bellis without
directly overruling the holding in Boyd.93
While the collective entity line of cases that culminated in Bellis
may have effectively overruled the Fifth Amendment holding of Boyd
when a document subpoena is directed to an organization, a central
premise of Boyd survived the collective entity line of cases intact and
unquestioned. As Justice Marshall emphasized in his Bellis footnote
distinguishing Boyd, the latter case was decided "on the premise that it
involved 'the compulsory production of a man's private papers.' 94
Nothing in Bellis or any of the collective entity cases that preceded it
suggests that a distinction should be drawn between documents and
testimony, so long as it is an individual and not a collective entity being
compelled to provide them. To the contrary, the Court's analysis in
Bellis began with an acknowledgment that "[i]t has long been established,
of course, that the Fifth Amendment protects an individual from
compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as

88 The Court noted that not all partnerships would meet the White test. It suggested that a
small family partnership or a partnership where pre-existing relationships of confidentiality existed
among the partners would might be exempt from such a test. See id. at 101.
89 See id. at 93, 97-98. Justice Douglas dissented from the Court's holding, arguing that Bellis
was not holding the partnership records in a representative capacity, but rather because they were
"his own, in both a legal and practical sense." Id. at 104. Justice Douglas pointed out that if Bellis
had been conducting a solo law practice, he could have asserted a Fifth Amendment privilege, and
argued that he should not be held to have forfeited his constitutional right by joining with two others
in a law partnership. Id.
90 See id. at 95 n.2.
91 Id.

92 Id.
93 Justice Douglas viewed the matter differently. In his dissenting opinion he described the
majority opinion in Bellis as "effectively overruling Boyd in holding that the Government can compel
an individual to produce his private records to aid a government investigation of him." Id. at 105.
94 Id. at 95 n.2 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886)).
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compelled oral testimony." 95 Therefore, it seems fair to conclude that the
development of the collective entity doctrine alone did not lead to the
dramatic reinterpretation of the Fifth Amendment's application to
documents that the Court announced in Fisher.
3.

The New Focus on Personal Compulsion.

Certain elements of the reasoning underlying the collective entity
doctrine, however, seem to have influenced the Fisher Court's new
concept of the protection provided by the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. That reasoning can be found in the Court's
opinion in Couch v. United States,96 a case decided the year before Bellis
that foreshadowed what was to come three years later in Fisher. Couch
was the sole owner of a restaurant who had hired an accountant to
prepare her income tax returns and in so doing Couch had given the
accountant her business' records.98 The Internal Revenue Service began
an investigation of Couch's tax returns, examined her business records
that were in the possession of her accountant, 9 9 and, based upon the
examination, commenced an investigation 00 of Couch."0 ' When an IRS
special agent arrived to re-examine Couch's business records at the office
of the accountant, he was denied access to the records, so he issued a
summons to the accountant requiring production of the records at a later
date."3 2 When he arrived to review the records on the return date of the
summons, he discovered that the accountant had given the records to
Couch's attorney.'0 3
The IRS petitioned the district court to enforce the summons, and
after the court ordered the summons to be enforced, Couch appealed.'O
Couch argued, before the Supreme Court, that she could assert the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 5 because she owned the

95 See id. at 87.
96 409 U.S. 322 (1973).

97 Although they were business records, the Court seems to assume that they would still be
"private" papers.

See id. at 330 (discussing application of Boyd). Instead, the Court focused its

analysis on the fact that ownership and possession of Couch's records diverged (see discussion infra).
98 See Couch, 409 U.S. at 324. The business records provided by Couch to the accountant
included bank statements, payroll records, and reports of sales and expenditures. Id.

99 They examined the records in the accountant's office with his permission. See id.
100 The IRS was investigating the possibility of income tax fraud. See id.
101 See id.
102 The IRS had issued a summons, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7602, on August 18, 1969; the
return date of the summons was September 2, 1969. See Couch, 409 U.S. at 324-25.
103 See id. at 325.
104 See id. at 329.
105 Couch also claimed that the summons violated the Fourth Amendment but the Court
refused to consider this argument since it was not raised in appellant's brief. See id. at 325 n.6.
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business records. 106 The Couch court rejected this argument, holding that
Couch's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was not violated
because there was no governmental compulsion and no reasonable
expectation of privacy. 107
The Court reiterated that the privilege against self-incrimination is
a purely personal privilege0 8 and that the privilege is intended to protect
against the "extortion of information from the accused himself" 0 9 rather
than to prevent incriminating evidence from being produced by a third
party. 0 This aspect of the Court's reasoning is consistent with the
collective entity cases, which emphasized the personal nature of the
privilege and the separate identity of the organization."' The other aspect
of the Court's reasoning in Couch, in contrast, signals a new approach to
Fifth Amendment analysis. The Court reasoned that since Couch herself
had not been compelled to do anything," 2 there was none of the personal
compulsion that is required for an individual to invoke the Fifth
Amendment privilege. "'
The Court emphasized that the Fifth
Amendment privilege does not protect the accused when third parties are
compelled to produce incriminating evidence; the privilege only protects
the accused from having to produce that incriminating evidence herself." 4
Couch therefore marks the beginning of the Court's focus on the element
of compulsion in Fifth Amendment cases, albeit in the context of a case in
which a third party had possession of the documents at issue.
Much as it would do the following year in Bellis, the Couch
Court sought to distinguish Boyd without directly overruling it. The
Court held that mere ownership of documents without possession is not
always sufficient to invoke the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, noting that decisions applying Boyd had "largely been in

106 See id. at 325.
107 See id. at 336.
108 "A party is privileged from producing the evidence [himself] but not from its production."
Id. at 328 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913)).
109 "Our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-

accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system
of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment

and abuses; our sense of fair play.. . [and] our respect for the inviolability of the human personality
and of the rights of each individual" dictate this protection. Couch, 409 U.S. at 328 (quoting
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n., 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
110 See Couch, 409 U.S. at 328.
111 See supra Part I.A.2.; see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88-91 (1974)
(summarizing cases).
112 The summons and the order enforcing it were directed against the accountant, not Couch
herself. See Couch, 409 U.S. at 329.
113 See id.
114 See id. It is noteworthy that even here, in the decision that is the closest antecedent to
Fisher,the Supreme Court did not distinguish between compulsion to produce documentary evidence
and compulsion to provide oral testimony.
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instances where possession and ownership conjoined."115 To address the
undisputed fact that Couch retained ownership of the documents at

issue," 6 the Court reasoned that "possession bears the closest relationship
to the personal compulsion forbidden by the Fifth Amendment"" 7 and
that ownership is not a workable litmus test for application of the Fifth
Amendment's protections. " This focus on "personal compulsion" is
indicative of the approach to Fifth Amendment analysis that the Court
would take a few years later in Fisher.

While the Couch Court emphasized possession rather than
ownership, it was careful to point out that it was not adopting a simple
"bright-line

rule"

based

on possession. "'

Instead

the

Court

acknowledged that situations could arise in which constructive possession
of documents by the accused or temporary, insignificant relinquishment
of possession" ° would support a claim of unconstitutional governmental
compulsion by the owner if the documents were then seized from the
person who had possession. ' Couch's surrender of possession, " in
contrast, was sufficient to "disqualify her entirely as an object of any
impermissible Fifth Amendment compulsion.""
At the conclusion of its opinion in Couch, the Court stated that

the important factors to examine in assessing Fourth or Fifth Amendment
claims are (i)whether there is an expectation of privacy, and (ii)whether

115 Id. at 330.
116 See id. at 324.
117 Id. at 331.
118 Id. The Court took the position that if ownership of the documents at issue was the sole
test for application of the privilege, it would have the incongruous result of protecting business
records owned by the accused that were in the possession of an accountant, while not protecting
business information communicated to the accountant orally or by letter such that title to the
documents containing the information was held by the accountant. Id. In the Court's view, this
approach "would thus place unnecessary emphasis on the form of communication to an accountant
and the accountant's own working methods, while diverting the inquiry from the basic purposes of
the Fifth Amendment's protections." Id. Unfortunately, the Court did not further identify or explain
those purposes or why they would be offended by a voluntary relinquishment of information to a third
party. In fact, providing information to a third party outside the context of a privileged relationship,
see id. at 335-36 (explaining that Couch's communications with her accountant were not privileged),
may well result in a loss of Fifth Amendment protection even under the modem act of production
doctrine. For further discussion of this issue, see infra note 203.
119 Couch, 409 U.S. at 336 n.20.
120 An example raised at oral argument was a subpoena served on a third party who was
carrying the accused's briefcase across the street. Id. at 333 n.15. The Court declined to judge the
merits of hypothetical fact situations, however. Id.
121 Id. at 333.
122 The Court noted both the length of time Couch's accountant had possessed the records and
the accountant's independent status. See id. at 334. Couch's records had been in her accountant's
continuous possession for fourteen years prior to the issuance of the summons and the accountant did
not work as an employee of Couch. See id. Presumably, if Couch had surrendered possession of the
documents to an employee for a short period of time, the outcome would have been different.
123 Id. at 334-35.
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there is governmental compulsion against the accused himself." a As the
discussion below points out, only one of these considerationscompulsion against the accused-survived Fisher'snew approach to Fifth
Amendment analysis. The other consideration identified by the Couch
Court-the expectation of privacy -was rejected by Fisher and its
progeny as not among the interests protected by the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.
B.

The FisherDecision and the Fifth Amendment "Act of
Production" Doctrine.

1.

Fisher'sNew Textualist Analytical Approach.
In Hubbell, the Supreme Court began its analysis of the Fifth

Amendment's application to compelled production of documents with the
"settled proposition that a person may be required to produce specific
documents even though they contain incriminating assertions of fact or
belief because the creation of those documents was not 'compelled' within
the meaning of the privilege." 126 This matter of fact assertion,
unthinkable in the era of Boyd, is a direct outgrowth of Fisher's new
conception of the nature of the protection against self-incrimination
provided by the Fifth Amendment. 27
Fisher rejected both property rights' and personal privacy2 9 as

rationales for protection against self-incrimination; instead, it looked to
124 See id. at 336.
125 The clearest indication that Couch foreshadowed a major shift in the Court's conception of
the protection provided by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is the argument
contained in Justice Marshall's dissent. The Marshall dissent in Couch seems to recognize that the
majority's focus on possession and compulsion threatened the Fifth Amendment holding of Boyd that
had survived the development of the collective entity doctrine. Justice Marshall argued that if the act
of producing the documents would be incriminating it would be unconstitutional. See id. at 347.
Justice Marshall believed that criteria should be developed to determine whether records sought by
summonses were within the expectation of privacy of the accused. See id. at 350. His suggested
criteria were as follows: "the nature of the evidence . . . the ordinary operations of the person to
whom the records are given . . . the purposes for which the records were transferred ... [and] the
steps taken by the accused to insure the privacy of the records." See id. at 350-51.
126 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35-36 (2000) [hereinafter Hubbell 11].
127 See generally Kenneth J. Melilli, Act-of-Production Immunity, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 235
(1991); Anne Marie DeMarco & Elisa Scott, Confusion Among the Courts: Should the Contents of
PersonalPapersbe Privileged by the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause?, 9 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 219, 219 (1993); Note, The Rights of Criminal Defendants and the Subpoena
Duces Tecum: The Aftermath of Fisher v. United States, supra note 1, at 683.
128 See, e.g., Heidt, supra note 45, at 470; see also Note, The Rights of Criminal Defendants
and the Subpoena Duces Tecum: The Aftermath of Fisher v. United States, supra note 1, at 684-85
(discussing the pre-Fisher "property-oriented view of the Fifth Amendment and concluding that
Fisherand its progeny have "narrowed and ultimately rejected this view").
129 See United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 572 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("As the Supreme Court
moved away from the doctrine articulated in Boyd v. United States . . . and towards a more literal
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the text 3 ° of the Fifth Amendment and focused on the compulsion of

"testimonial" communications as the touchstone for self-incrimination
analysis.'
Whatever the merits of this new analytical approach, it is
undisputed that it narrowed the protection against self-incrimination
afforded by the Fifth Amendment.' 32 This narrower reading of the Fifth

Amendment may have been necessitated by the application of the Fifth
Amendment (with other provisions of the Bill of Rights) to the states and
the subsequent development of the line of authority permitting compulsion
of handwriting specimens, voice exemplars, and blood samples on the

theory that such information was not "testimonial." 133 The net result,
however, was a virtually complete redefinition of what constitutes
"communicative"

Amendment.

135

134

testimony

that

is

protected

by

the

Fifth

interpretation of the privilege against self-incrimination . . . it jettisoned the personal privacy
justification in favor of a rationale tied far more directly to the nature of government compulsion.")
(citations omitted); see also Note, The Rights of Criminal Defendants and the Subpoena Duces
Tecum: The Aftermath of Fisher v. United States, supra note 1, at 686 (stating that "under Fisher
mere privacy concerns are unprotected by the fifth amendment"); United States v. Doe, 465 U.S.
605, 611 (1984) [hereinafter Doe 1];Heidt, supra note 45, at 471; Suzanne Rosenthal Brackley,
ConstitutionalLaw: Now it's Personal:Withdrawing the Fifth Amendment's Content-BasedProtection
for all Private Papers in United States v. Doe, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 553, 571 (1994); Note, The
Rights of Criminal Defendants and the Subpoena Duces Tecum: The Aftermath of Fisher v. United
States, supra note 1, at 694 & text accompanying nn.62-63; Will, supranote 6, at 975.
130 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1976) (quoting the text of the fifth
amendment and emphasizing the words "compelled" and "witness against himself"); see also Doe I,
465 U.S. at 610; South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 562 (1983); Nagareda, supra note 7, at
1597; Will, supranote 6, at 975.
131 This new approach is subject to challenge on grounds of historical validity, see Hubbell,
530 U.S. at 49 (Thomas, J.and Scalia, I. concurring) and Nagareda, supra note 7, at 1591, but the
historical merit of the Fisher approach fals outside the scope of this Article.
132 See, e.g., Leo P. Martinez, The Summons Power and Tar Court Discovery: A Different
Perspective, 13 VA. TAx REV. 731, 741 (1994); Comment, The Rights of Criminal Defendants and
the Subpoena Duces Tecum: The Aftermath of Fisher v. United States, supranote 1, at 683 (observing
that "the focus on compulsion has narrowed the protection offered by the fifth amendment");
Brackley, supranote 129, at 558; Shauna J.Sullivan, Fifth Amendment Protectionand the Production
of CorporateDocuments, 135 U. PA. L. Rnv. 747, 755 (1987).
133 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 408; see also United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 572-75
(1999) (discussing "nontestimonial" cases), ag'd., 530 U.S. 27, 46 (2000); Comment, Fifth
Amendment Interpretationin Recent Tax Record Production Cases, 46 U. CINN. L. RV.232, 23638 (1977) (discussing the development of the "nontestimonial rationale" and observing that the "main
application of the nontestimonial rationale has been in cases dealing with the compelled production of
evidence relating to physical characteristics"); Nagareda, supra note 7, at 1590-91; Arthur B. Laby,
Fishingfor Documents Overseas: The Supreme Court UpholdsBroad Consent DirectivesAgainst the
Claim of Self-Incrimination, 70 B.U. L. REv. 311, 332 (1990). The "nontestinonial" physical
production cases are described infra at notes 214-17.
134 See Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 574.
135 Justice Brennan recognized Fisher's potential for redefining the scope of the fifth
amendment's protection of private papers, declining to join in the majority opinion "because of the
portent of much of what is said of a serious crippling of the protection secured by the privilege
against the compelled production of one's private books and papers." Fisher, 425 U.S. at 414
(Brennan, J.,
concurring).
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The most recent and most detailed explication of the Fisher

analytical approach to Fifth Amendment protection is the lengthy opinion
of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in the Hubbell case. 136 At
the outset of its opinion, the court forthrightly acknowledged that it was
dealing with an "admittedly abstract and under-determined area of the

law."

137

This candid acknowledgement reflects the confusion and

criticism that the Fisher opinion has spawned in the twenty-five years
since it was decided.' 38 The lengths (both literal and figurative) to which
the D.C. Circuit went 139 to explain how Fisher applies to that most simple
and straightforward legal discovery device-a subpoena for documents
and business records-reflects this confusion and demonstrates the crying

need for clarity in this important area of law. Before examining the D.C.
Circuit's analysis in Hubbell, it is useful to examine the analytical
framework established by the Supreme Court in Fisherand its progeny.

2.

Compulsion of Testimonial Communications.

The main source of confusion in the Fisher opinion is the
distinction that the Court drew between the testimonial aspects of the
contents of documents, on the one hand, and the act of producing the
documents, on the other."4 In Fisher, Justice White acknowledged that a

subpoena requiring a taxpayer to produce "an accountant's workpapers in
136 United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552 (1999), aff'd., 530 U.S. 27, 46 (2000). The D.C.
Circuit is not alone in recognizing the difficulty of the legal analysis required by Fisher. In 1987,
Professor Mosteller noted that "[tihe law in this area is extraordinarily complicated and conflicting."
Mosteller, supra note 1, at 1. Prior to Hubbell, lower court decisions applying Fisher and its
progeny had further confused the already-confusing principles set out in Fisher.
137 Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 570. Professor Uviller has described the law in this area as "an
obscure-if not exotic-extension of the Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to assist in one's
own conviction." Uviller, supra note 23, at 312.
138 See, e.g., Brackley, supra note 129, at 570; Davis, supra note 5, at 108; Nagareda, supra
note 7, at 1578.
139 In addition to the standard citations to case law and law review articles, the thirty-one
page, per curian majority opinon (which, in fairness, includes almost ten pages devoted to the issue
of whether Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr had jurisdiction to pursue Hubbell for tax evasion
and related crimes, see Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 554-63) contains citations to works on logic by
philosophers David Hume and Bertrand Russell, id. at 570, and on the limits of categorization by
Ludwig Wittgenstein, id. at 578. As the dissenting judge notes, Fisherand its progeny have fostered
more "metaphysical speculation" than legal clarity in the area of Fifth Amendment protections. See
id. at 597 (Williams, J., dissenting) (citing Alito, supra note 8, at 59 (predicting that Fisherand Doe
would "inevitably lead" to "metaphysical speculation")). Ironically, citations to philosophers and
concerns about metaphysical speculation notwithstanding, the net result of the Hubbell holding is to
restore Fifth Amendment protection of an individual's documents to something very near the
straightforward, common-sense rules that applied prior to Fisher. See infra Parts II.B.2. and IV.C.
140 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410-11 (1976). The Fisher court did not invent the act of
production theory; the theory's origins can be traced back to Wigmore's treatise on evidence, which
criticized the Boyd opinion and offered the act of production theory as a means of rationalizing the
holding in that case. See Alito, supra note 8, at 46; see also Heidt, supranote 45, at 442 (describing
Fisheras having "adopted the implied admissions rationale long espoused by Wigmnore").
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his possession without doubt involves substantial compulsion." 141
Nonetheless, because the subpoena does not compel oral testimony and
does not compel the taxpayer to "restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of the
contents of the documents sought," the Court concluded that compelling a
taxpayer to produce his accountant's workpapers does not violate the
Fifth Amendment." This conclusion rested upon the premise that "the
privilege protects a person only against being incriminated by his own
compelled testimonial communications," " and no testimonial
communications would be compelled from the taxpayer. Applying this
reasoning to the two cases under review in Fisher, Justice White
repeatedly emphasized in his opinion the factual bases for this conclusion:
in both cases, (i) the subpoenaed documents were the accountants' papers,
not the personal papers of the taxpayers; " (ii) the papers were not
prepared by the taxpayers;145 (iii) the papers were prepared voluntarily,
without any compulsion; 46 (iv) the taxpayers would not be required to
authenticate the papers;147 and (v) the existence of the papers was known
4
1

to the government.

1

141 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409.
142 Id. In Fisherthe taxpayers had transferred possession of the workpapers to their attorneys,
but the Court concluded that the transfers to the attorneys for the purpose of obtaining legal advice
did not waive any Fifth Amendment privilege that the taxpayers otherwise could have asserted. Id. at
402-405. The Court then went on to conclude that, for the reasons discussed, the taxpayers had no
Fifth Amendment privilege in the accountants' workpapers. Id. at 414.
143 Id.
144 Id. ("The accountant's workpapers are not the taxpayer's."); id. at 411 ("The papers
belong to the accountant, were prepared by him, and are the kind usually prepared by an accountant
working on the tax returns of his client."); id. at 414 ("Whether the Fifth Amendment would shield
the taxpayer from producing his own tax records in his possession is a question not involved here; for
the papers demanded here are not his 'private papers,' ....
).
145 Id. at 409 ("They were not prepared by the taxpayer, and they contain no testimonial
declarations by him."); id. at 411 ("The papers belong to the accountant, were prepared by him, and
are the kind usually prepared by an accountant working on the tax returns of his client."); id. at 413
("The taxpayer did not prepare the papers and could not vouch for their accuracy.").
146 Id. at 409 ("Furthermore, as far as the record demonstrates, the preparation of all of the
papers sought in these cases was wholly voluntary . . . ."); id. at 410 n.11 ("And, unless the
Government has compelled the subpoenaed person to write the document ....
the fact that it was
written by him is not controlling with respect to the Fifth Amendment issue.") (citations omitted).
147 Id. at 412-13 ("As for the possibility that responding to the subpoena would authenticate
the work papers, production would express nothing more than the taxpayer's belief that the papers are
those described in the subpoena. The taxpayer would be no more competent to authenticate the
accountant's work papers or reports by producing them than he would be to authenticate them if
testifying orally.") (footnote omitted); id. at 413 n.13 ("In seeking the accountant's 'retained copies'
of correspondence with the taxpayer in No. 74-611, we assume that the summons sought only
'copies' of original letters sent from the accountant to the taxpayer-the truth of the contents of which
could be testified to only by the accountant.").
148 Id. at 411 ("The existence and location of the papers are a foregone conclusion and the
taxpayer adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's information by conceding that he
in fact has the papers."); id. ("Surely the Government is in no way relying on the 'truthtelling' of the
taxpayer to prove the existence of or his access to the documents."). As the D.C. Circuit noted in its
Hubbell opinion, "[In the Fishercase, the] taxpayer had also stipulated to both the existence of the
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Contents versus Act of Production.

Had the Fisher opinion stopped at this point in its analysis and
merely held that under those particular circumstances the taxpayers' Fifth
Amendment privilege would not protect against compelled production by
the taxpayers' attorneys of the accountants' papers, then the opinion
would have been unremarkable and probably now would be long-since
forgotten. 149 In an effort (arguably a reach 150) to rationalize Fifth
Amendment law and provide an analytical framework for future cases,
however, the opinion went on, beyond the facts of the cases then before
the Court, 151 and laid the groundwork for the "act of production
doctrine." 152 The cornerstone of this doctrine is the statement in Fisher
that "the act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena nevertheless
has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the contents of
the papers produced." 153 The Court identified those communicative
aspects as the subpoena respondent "tacitly conced[ing]" that the papers
produced in response to a subpoena (1) exist, (2) are in the respondent's
54
possession or control, and (3) are those described by the subpoena. 1
Whether or not a particular production of documents would involve a tacit
testimonial communication of these facts would "depend on the facts and
circumstances of particular cases or classes thereof," 155 but the Court
concluded that in Fisher the enforcement of the subpoenas for the
accountants' papers would not compel the taxpayers to communicate any
56
of these three categories of information. 1
The Court's analysis of the testimonial value of the
communication inherent in the act of production of the documents sought
in the Fishercase ultimately would raise more questions than it answered.
documents and that they were those described in the subpoena." United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d

552, 570 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Fisher,425 U.S. at 430 n.9 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
149 C. Alito, supra note 8, at 42 ("Fisher involved a more complicated factual situation and
could well have been decided without reexamining Boyd.").
150 Cf. Heidt, supra note 45, at 473 (characterizing the implied admissions theory as
"attenuated in principle and unworkable in application").
151 The Court couldjust as easily have concluded that because the papers sought here were the
accountants' papers, not the taxpayers' papers, see supra nn.144-48 (listing the five factors upon
which the Fisher Court based its opinion), nothing of substance was being compelled from the
taxpayers. Compare Fisher,425 U.S. at 397 ("The taxpayer's privilege under this Amendment is not
violated by enforcement of the summonses involved in these cases because enforcement against a
taxpayer's lawyer would not 'compel' the taxpayer to do anything-and certainly would not compel
him to be a 'witness' against himself.").
152 See Fisher,425 U.S. at 410-11.
153 Id. at 410.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 See id. at411-13.
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In Fisher, the Court could easily dispose of the issue because the
government already knew of the documents' existence and location,
permitting the Court to coin its celebrated "foregone conclusion" phrase:
"The existence and location of the papers are a foregone conclusion and
the taxpayer adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's
information by conceding that he in fact has the papers.""' Although the
"foregone conclusion" characterization applied well to the unusual facts
of Fisher, it merely begged the question of whether the Fifth Amendment
would protect the act of production of documents in the more typical case
in which15 8a witness is subpoenaed to produce his or her own "private
papers."
4.

United States v. Doe and the Failure of the Court to Articulate a
"Testimonial Value" Test.

Fisher expressly declined to decide "[w]hether the Fifth
Amendment would shield the taxpayer from producing his own tax
records in his possession."' 59 The Court addressed that question seven
years later in United States v. Doe.16° Doe held that the contents of an
individual's voluntarily prepared business records are not protected by the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination."' The conclusion
that the contents of an individual's business records are not privileged
settled one question and reversed the decision below of the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, which had held that notwithstanding Fisherthe contents
of an individual's business records are privileged; 62 however, it was the
beginning, not the end, of the Court's analysis of the application of the
privilege to private business records. The remaining question was
whether the act of production of private business records is protected by
the Fifth Amendment under the Fisher "testimonial communications"
analytical approach.
With respect to this critical issue the Doe Court, like the Fisher
Court seven years earlier, declined to articulate a test of general
application that the lower courts could use to assess the testimonial value
of an act of production of documents. Fisher had said only that the
resolution of this issue "depend[s] on the facts and circumstances of
157 Id. at 411.

158 Id. at 414.
159 Id. at 414; see also United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 610 (1983) [hereinafter Doe 1]
("The Court in Fisher expressly declined to reach the question whether the Fifth Amendment
privilege protects the contents of an individual's tax records in his possession.") (footnote omitted).
160 Doe 1,465 U.S. 605.
161 See id. at 612.
162 680 F.2d 327, 334 (3d Cir. 1982); see Doe ,465 U.S. at 609 (describing the holding of
the Court of Appeals).
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particular cases or classes thereof."1 63 Doe, rather than identifying or
defining a "testimonial value test" for deciding when an act of producing
documents is privileged under the Fifth Amendment, relied upon the
factual findings of the two courts below, the District Court for the
District of New Jersey and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. Those
courts had held that the act of producing the documents under subpoena in
that case "would involve testimonial self-incrimination."" 6 Because both
lower courts had concluded that the act of producing the documents
would involve testimonial communications as defined in Fisher, the Doe
Court accepted that conclusion, but did not independently address or
analyze the issue.s
Oddly enough, the net result of the two cases was a new legal
doctrine-the Fisher "testimonial communications" analysis applied to the
act of production of documents-announced by the Court with no real
guidance to the lower federal courts as to how that doctrine should be
applied. Add to that the fact that this new doctrine applied to the basic
discovery device for federal criminal investigations, the grand jury
subpoena duces tecum, 66 and it is not surprising that the net result of this
lack of specific analytical guidance was what the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals in the Hubbell case called an "admittedly abstract and
163 Fisher,425 U.S. at 410.
164 Doe I, 465 U.S. at 613 n.l1 (citing the district court's factual finding) and n. 12 (citing the
appeals court's factual analysis).
165 Id. at 614. The Court did apply the "facts and circumstances" test a few years later, in
Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 214-15 (1988) [hereinafter Doe III (applying the Fisher "facts
and circumstances of the particular case" test and concluding that forcing an individual to sign a
consent form authorizing foreign banks to release information about accounts he controlled "[in] itself
is 'not testimonial.'" Doe I, however, involved the unusual circumstance of compelling consent in
the form of a signature on a blank release, which the Court equated to nontestimonial actions such as
providing a blood sample, see id.. at 213 n.11, or providing a voice exemplar, see id. at 214 n.12.
The Court also appeared to find significance in the fact that it was a third party-the foreign bankswho was providing the evidence, and not the individual who was asserting the Fifth Amendment
privilege. See id. at 213 n.11 (noting that "it is difficult to understand how compelling a suspect to
make a nonfactual statement that facilitates the production of evidence by someone else offends the
privilege") (emphasis added). For these reasons, Doe 11, at least as conceptualized by the Court, fits
more closely within the Schmerber/Dionisioline of "forced production of physical evidence" cases
than the Fisher/DoeI "compelled production of documents" cases, and therefore provides little, if
any, guidance in the latter area. Justice Stevens, dissenting in Doe 1I, argued that forcing a suspect to
sign a consent form is fundamentally different from forcing him to provide physical evidence, Id. at
219 and n.1. He equated forced production of physical evidence with the forced "surrender [of] a
key to a lockbox" (which the Fifth Amendment permits), but equated forced signature of a consent
form to "be[ing] compelled to reveal the combination to a wall safe" (which the Fifth Amendment
does not permit). See id. at 219. Although Justice Stevens dissented alone in Doe II, his "lockbox
key/wall safe combination" analogy survived and was utilized by the D.C. Circuit in United States v.
Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 580 (1999), aff'd., 530 U.S. 27, 46 (2000), and it appears that the Supreme
Court's Hubbell decision supports his conception of the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment.
See infra Part III. B.
166 See supra note 18.
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under-determined area of law." 167 What is surprising is that it took
twenty-five years for the Supreme Court to do what it had failed to do in
Fisher(and in Doe)"6 -address the question of when the act of producing
documents is a "testimonial communication" that is protected by the Fifth

Amendment.

169

III. The Impact of the Hubbell Case on Fifth Amendment Doctrine.

A.

The D.C. Circuit's Analysis of the Act of Production
Doctrine in Hubbell.

1.

United States v. Hubbell - The Factual Setting.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals labored mightily to
apply the principles of Fisherand Doe I to the facts of the Hubbell case-

facts that required an analysis of the application of the Fifth Amendment
to the compelled production of private papers by an individual who was
the target of a criminal grand jury investigation. In this regard, the facts
of the Hubbell case differed from those of Fisher and Doe I in one
Webster Hubbell initially invoked his Fifth
important respect.

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and declined to produce
any documents o in response to a "broad-reaching 171 subpoena duces
tecum" issued by the Office of Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr. 72
167 Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 570. In its Hubbell opinion, the D.C. Circuit described the issue as
follows: "The degree to which a communication must be testimonial, what the Doe I Court described
as its "testimonial value," Doe 1, 465 U.S. at 613, before it will invoke the Fifth Amendment's
protections necessarily falls somewhere in between the poles represented by Doe I and Fisher.
Precisely where on this continuum a given document production crosses the rubicon remains
undetermined. The same can be said for the requisite quantum of incrimination." Hubbell, 167 F.3d
at 569.
168 The Court has itself acknowledged this fMling of Fisherand Doe L See Doe v. United
States, 487 U.S. 201, 209 (1988) [hereinafter Doe 11] ("While the Court in Fisherand Doe did not
purport to announce a universal test for determining the scope of the privilege, it also did not purport
to establish a more narrow boundary applicable to acts alone.") In 1987, Professor Mosteller
observed that Fisherand Doe left "the full meaning" of the Fifth Amendment principles announced in
those cases "unclear" and that "the Court has offered little guidance on how to apply the testimonial
and incriminating inquiries to the act of production." See Mosteller, supra note 1, at 3.
169 See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
170 When he initially appeared before the grand jury, Hubbell "expressly 'decline[d] to state
whether there are documents within my possession, custody, or control responsive to the Subpoena.'"
See Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 565 (quoting from Nov. 19, 1996 grand jury transcript).
171 The "Subpoena Rider" that accompanied the subpoena duces tecum directed to Hubbell
required production of eleven broad categories of documents "reflecting, referring, or relating" to
Hubbell's activities, work, income, banking activities, and contacts with particular individuals. The
subpoena rider is reproduced as an Appendix to the Opinion of the Court in the Supreme Court's
decision in the case. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 46-49 (Appendix).
172 See Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 563.
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Hubbell produced the subpoenaed documents only after the Independent
Counsel used an immunity order 7 3 to overcome Hubbell's assertion of his
Fifth Amendment privilege with regard to the act of production. 174
Information contained in the documents produced by Hubbell under the
grant of immunity led directly 75 to his indictment for tax evasion and
related charges. 17 6 The prosecutorial use of the contents of the documents
that Hubbell had produced with "act of production" immunity forced the
appellate court 7 7 to include the element of immunity in the already

complicated Fifth Amendment act of production analysis.

178

Neither

Fisher nor Doe had involved an immunity grant to the individual
producing the documents to the prosecution, so the Supreme Court had
not included this important additional element in its prior analyses of the
For the D.C. Court of
Fifth Amendment and the act of production.'
Appeals, Hubbell's immunity grant was a critical factor,8 0 but the focus
of the court's analysis was on the act of production and whether that act
173 The immunity order was entered pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6002, and gave Hubbell "use
and derivative use" immunity for the act of producing the subpoenaed documents. See id. at 563.
See generally Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). Use and derivative use immunity is
discussed further infra Part IV.C.
174 See Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 563.
175 At oral argument in the Supreme Court, counsel representing the Office of Independent
Counsel Starr acknowledged that "[w]e absolutely did not know about the contents of the documents"
and the Court was "absolutely right" in its understanding that it was only by virtue of the production
of documents that the prosecutors learned the facts that enabled them to prosecute Hubbell. 2000 WL
230520, at 3 (Transcript of Supreme Court Oral Argument).
176 Id. The ten-count indictment "alleged that Webster Hubbell, together with his wife
Suzanna Hubbell, his tax lawyer Charles Owen, and his accountant Mike Schaufele, had committed
various counts of fraud and tax evasion." Id. "Using the contents of the documents turned over to
the grand jury, the Independent Counsel identified and developed evidence that culminated in the
prosecution at issue in this case." Id.
177 The district court had granted Hubbell's motion to dismiss all counts of the indictment,
concluding that because of the act of production immunity order and compelled production of
documents "Mr. Hubbell was thereby turned into the primary informant against himself." See United
States v. Hubbell, 11 F. Supp. 2d 25, 37 (D.D.C. 1998). In reaching this conclusion, the district
court focused on the "existence" aspect of the act of production analysis and emphasized that the
documents Hubbell produced "added to the 'sum total' of the independent counsel's information
about him." Id. at 35. As is discussed in more detail below, the D.C. Court of Appeals faulted the
district court for focusing its existence analysis on the contents of the documents, rather than "the
government's knowledge as to the existence, possession or control, and authenticity of the
subpoenaed documents-i.e., the testimonial components of the act of production." See Hubbell, 167
F.3d at 580. The court of appeals stressed that the district court's "inquiry should have focused upon
whether the government knew that the documents existed at all, and not upon whether the
government know of the existence of the information contained therein." Id.
178 In fact, the court presented its Fifth Amendment analysis under the heading "Immunity" in
the relevant portion of its opinion. See Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 563.
179 The district court noted that only one Supreme Court Justice had addressed "the effect of
act-of-production immunity on a subsequent prosecution." See Hubbell, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 35 n.13
(discussing Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Fisherv. United States).
180 The importance of the immunity grant to the court is evidenced by the fact that the section
of the opinion containing the court's Fifth Amendment analysis is presented under the heading
"Immunity." See Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 563.
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constituted a compelled testimonial communication of incriminating
information.' 8 ' Only after addressing that issue did the court turn to
question of the effect of the immunity grant and a Kastigaranalysis."
The court relied upon Fisher and Doe I for the "framework""8 3 of
its act of production analysis. 184 It presented those two cases as
essentially creating an analytical continuum, with Fisher at one end
establishing two key points: (i) the Fifth Amendment "does not protect
the contents of pre-existing, voluntarily prepared documents,"'8' and (ii)
the act of production does not implicate the Fifth Amendment if the
existence and location of the subpoenaed documents is a "foregone
conclusion" so that the government is not relying upon the "truth telling"
of the witness who produces the documents. 86 At the other end of the
continuum is Doe I, in which the government "knew little about the
documents it subpoenaed" 87 and therefore was unable to establish that
"possession, existence, and authentication were a 'foregone
conclusion."' 88 In the latter, Doe I situation, "complying with the
subpoena would involve testimonial self-incrimination," 1 9 while in the
former, Fisher situation, "the Fifth Amendment's protections were not
implicated.""' Without further guidance from the Supreme Court, the
D.C. Circuit recognized that "[p]recisely where on this continuum a
given document production crosses the rubicon remains undetermined."'"
The court then proceeded to place a marker in those uncharted waters by
defining its own test to determine when the production of documents is a
testimonial communication protected by the Fifth Amendment.

181 See id. at 569-81 (Part I.B.1.b. of the court's opinion).

182 For a more detailed discussion of Kastigar, see infra Part V.C.
183 See Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 567.

184 The court posed the basic Fifth Amendment inquiry as follows: "Whether addressed to
oral testimony or to documentary evidence, the doctrine necessitates a showing of: i) the compulsion;
ii) of testimony; iii) that incriminates." Id. (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976)
("mhe privilege protects a person only against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial

communications.")).
185
186
187
188

See Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 567.
See id. at 568.
Id.
See id. at 569 (citing United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 614 n.13 (1983) [hereinafter

Doe I]).
189 Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 569.
190 Id. at 568.
191 See infra Part II.B.1. (discussing the Supreme Court's failure to provide a test for when
the act of producing documents constitutes testimonial communication that is protected by the Fifth
Amendment).
192 Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 569.
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The D.C. Circuit's Analytical Approach.

In the analysis employed by the D.C. Circuit, one factual issue
was of paramount importance-how much information did the
government have about the existence, location, and authenticity of the
subpoenaed documents 193 at the time the subpoena was issued. 94 The
court refused to simply accept the Independent Counsel's assertion that
the subpoenaed documents existed and were in Webster Hubbell's
possession. Doing so, in the court's words, "glosses over what we
consider to be an essential component of any inquiry into the testimonial

value of a given act of production-the quantum of information possessed
by the government before it issued the relevant subpoena." 95 The court
proceeded to inquire into whether Hubbell's production of the documents
had communicated any incriminating information to the government.
The Independent Counsel had advanced two arguments that no
significant information was communicated and, therefore, the Fisher

"foregone conclusion" test was satisfied. The first argument was that
"the most natural reading of Fisher counsels against recognizing a
testimonial value in the production of ordinary income, financial, and
business records like those subpoenaed here" because most people
possess such records and the government cannot reasonably be expected
to know the details of exactly what such records a particular person

possesses. 96 The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument as both resting on
193 Here it is critical to note that the D.C. Circuit was not concerned with the contents of the
documents or, stated differently, the information the documents contained. It read Fisher as
establishing that the contents-the information in the documents-was not protected by the Fifth
Amendment so long as the documents were voluntarily prepared. See id. at 580 (faulting the district
court's analysis and explaining that "[tihe inquiry should have focused on whether the government
knew that the documents existed at all, and not upon whether the government knew of the information
contained therein").
194 One commentator has criticized this analytical approach, asserting that the testimonial
value of information should not be assessed based simply upon whether the government already
possesses that information. See Nagareda, supra note 7, at 1597-99 (arguing that the government's
preexisting knowledge is irrelevant to the status of being a witness against oneself; that the focus of
the Fifth Amendment is a "particular method of information gathering in itself," regardless of the
government's knowledge; and that the determination by a court of the government's knowledge will
be difficult in practice, and will result in divergent outcomes).
195 See Hubbell, 167 F.3d. at 569.
196 See id. at 570; see also 1999 VTL 1072535 at 33-34 (OIC brief) ("Because the subpoena in
this case, like the subpoena in Fisher, called only for specified categories of ordinary business
records, the decision in Fisher calls for the same conclusion here: The subpoena compelled
respondent to make no communication that rises to the level of testimony within the protection of the
Fifth Amendment."); 1999 WL 1076136 at 29-30 (DOJ brief) ("Thus, Fisher's 'foregone conclusion'
test focuses on broader categories of documents, and not on the individual documents that may fall
within the specifications of a subpoena. As applied to an individual who is or was engaged in
business, the test would therefore defeat any effort to invoke the Fifth Amendment to resist
compliance with a subpoena for ordinary business records, such as ledgers, bank records, invoices,
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flawed logic and misconstruing relevant Supreme Court precedent. The

primary error in this argument, according to the court, was that it "makes
the classical error in the field of logic" of assuming that future events can
be accurately predicted based upon past observations. 1" The court read
the relevant Supreme Court precedent as reflecting an understanding of

this point of logic and therefore "requir[ing] actual knowledge rather than
mere inductive generalizations." 9 8 The court pointed out that, in Fisher,
the government had "precise knowledge of the existence and location" of

the subpoenaed documents, and, therefore, the testimonial value of the act
of production "was negligible." 1 99 In Doe I, however, the government

sought a broad range of "ordinary income, financial, and business
records," but the court held that the act of production "would have

testimonial value meriting Fifth Amendment protection.
The different
outcomes in those two cases demonstrated that the Supreme Court did not
view the act of producing documents as being without testimonial value in
all cases where ordinary business records were being produced."'
The D.C. Circuit opinion went on to analyze cases from other
circuits that had been cited by the Independent Counsel in support of the
foregone conclusion/business records argument.2"a The court read those
cases as requiring the prosecution to have "first hand knowledge of the
documents' existence and whereabouts" 3 before that information could
receipts, and bills. Such documents are kept by every business, and conceding their existence
therefore 'adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's information.'") (internal
footnote and citation omitted.).
197 See id. at 570 (citing works on logic by philosophers David Hume and Bertrand Russell).
198 See id.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 C. id. at 571 (concluding that "the fact that the subpoena [in Doe 1] sought income,
financial, and business records did not undercut the testimonial value of the act of production")
(citing United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 614 n.13 (1983) [hereinafter Doe 1]).
202 See Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 571-72 (analyzing United States v. Rue, 819 F.2d 1488 (8th Cir.
1987) and United States v. Fishman, 726 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1983)).
203 See Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 571 (discussing Rue, 819 F.2d 1488). The D.C. Circuit's
analysis highlights the potential adverse consequences for targets or subjects of a criminal
investigation who "cooperate" with the government's investigation during its early stages. In Rue the
subject of the investigation, Dr. Rue, had permitted Internal Revenue Service agents to examine
records relating to his dentistry practice before a grand jury subpoena for those documents was
issued. See Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 571 (citing Rue, 819 F.2d at 1490). Dr. Rue had also had
repeatedly admitted that certain of the records existed. Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 571 (citing Rue, 819
F.2d at 1493-94). This information voluntarily provided to the government by Dr. Rue was
sufficient to meet the Fisher foregone conclusion test and, therefore, Dr. Rue had effectively (and
presumably unknowingly and unintentionally) waived his Fifth Amendment act of production
privilege before the grand jury subpoena had been issued. In the other case analyzed by the D.C.
Circuit, United States v. Fishman, 726 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1983), another doctor was being
investigated, but he apparently was somewhat less forthcoming with information about his business
records. Dr. Fishman had not admitted the existence and possession of the subpoenaed records, and
his "generalized reference" to the existence of a category of records did not constitute a
.representation or admission" that documents falling
into that category exist or are in his possession.
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be considered a "foregone conclusion" and thus not protected by the
privilege against self-incrimination.
The court stressed that "mere
conjecture" based upon assumptions about a particular kind of business 2 4
was not sufficient to establish that the existence and possession of

subpoenaed documents is a foregone conclusion."
The D.C. Circuit also rejected the Independent Counsel's second
foregone conclusion argument-that the prosecutors already had enough
information about the existence and Hubbell's possession of the

subpoenaed documents from other sources (i.e., Hubbell's statements
about his consulting work in congressional testimony, information in a
report prepared by the Department of Transportation Inspector General's
office, and the Independent Counsel's prior investigation of Hubbell's
work at the Rose Law Firm). In the court's view, "[these] snippets of
information do not come close to establishing the existence of the myriad
of documents sought through the subpoena. 2 6 The court concluded that
in order to meet the Fisher foregone conclusion test, the Independent
Counsel would have to "establish its knowledge [of the existence and

location of the subpoenaed documents] with a greater degree of
specificity" than assumptions based on general information about
Hubbell's business activities.2 7 As the quoted statements suggest, the
court was laying the groundwork for holding the government to a higher
standard of knowledge about the subpoenaed documents to meet the

See Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 571 (citing Fishman, 726 F.2d at 127 n.4). The implications of this
dichotomy-a witness who cooperates in Rue and is held to have waived his privilege versus a less
cooperative witness in Fishman, who is held to have retained his privilege-has implications for law
enforcement that are almost as significant as the Fisher/Doe continuum discussed above. The
practical effect of this distinction will be that any witness who has the benefit of informed legal
counsel will refuse to volunteer any information to government investigators at any stage of an
investigation because to do otherwise risks waiving the act of production privilege. Cf. Melissa D.
Shalit, Audit Inquiry Letters and Discovery: ProtectionBased on Compulsion, 15 CARDOZO L. REv.
1263, 1275 (1994) (discussing waiver of attorney-client and work product privileges); David M.
Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New World: The Death of Privilege in
Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CraM. L. REV. 147, 153 n.31 (2000) (discussing waiver
of attorney-client privilege). Finally, it is noteworthy that the case that the D.C. Circuit relied upon
most directly in its Hubbell analysis, In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 1 F.3d 87 (2d Cir.
1993), cooperation with a government investigation (in that case a Securities and Exchange
Commission investigation) also resulted in a waiver of the Fifth Amendment act of production
privilege. See id. at 93 ("Since Doe produced a copy of the calendar to the SEC and testified about
his possession and use of it, its existence and location are 'foregone conclusion[s],' and his
production of the original 'adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's information.'")
(alteration in original and citation omitted).
204 The Independent Counsel argued that "[gliven the nature of Hubbell's consulting work...
it [was] a foregone conclusion at the time of the subpoena that authentic business records existed and
were in Hubbell's possession." Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 571 n.25.
205 Id. at 571.
206 Id. at 572.
207 Id.
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foregone conclusion test as to existence and possession."'

The D.C.

Circuit's analysis of this argument put forth by the Independent Counsel
also underscores the risk of voluntarily sharing information with
government investigators because doing so will significantly enhance the
likelihood that prosecutors can meet the foregone conclusion test. 0 9 The

remaining and critical question was precisely what "degree of prior
knowledge [is] needed to render the existence, possession or authenticity

of documents a foregone conclusion."210

To answer that question, the

court found it "necessary to return to first principles."2 11

These "first principles" were that after the "act of production
trilogy" of Fisher, Doe 1,and Braswell, the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination applies only to compelled communication of
incriminating information-that is, "compelled truthtelling."212 The D.C.
Circuit described this "anti-extortion principle" as "the motivating force
of self-incrimination doctrine."213 The court also relied on this analytical
device to distinguish the Holt2 14-Schmerber2t5 -Gilbert 216-Wade217 line of
"compelled physical evidence" cases.2"' Although those cases involve

compulsion that resulted in the government obtaining significant
incriminating information from witnesses, the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination is not implicated because "the government has
no need to rely upon the witness's truthtelling to secure the evidence it
needs." 219 In other words, the witness is not compelled to use his or her
mind to provide truthful testimony.' 0 The compelled act of producing
208 See infra Part M.A. (comparing the Fourth Amendment particularity requirement for
obtaining a search warrant to the post-Hubbell Fifth Amendment requirements for overcoming act of
production use immunity).
209 See supra note 203.
210 Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 572.
211 Id. (citing Doe Irs description of Fisher and Doe I as "applying basic Fifth Amendment
principles").
212 See Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 575. Webster Hubbell's counsel emphasized this "compelled
truthtelling" approach to fifth amendment analysis at oral argument in the Supreme Court, see 2000
WL 230520 at 28, but the Court did not rely on this approach in its opinion, see infra Part U.B.
(discussing the Court's analysis in Hubbell).
213 Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 575.
214 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) (containing the seminal analysis of the
application of the Fifth Amendment to physical/bodily evidence in which Justice Holmes concluded
that forcing a defendant to wear a "blouse" worn in a murder for which he was being tried was not a
compelled communication protected by the fifth amendment).
215 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination does not apply to compelling a witness to provide a blood sample).
216 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination does not apply to compelling a witness to provide a handwriting exemplar).
217 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination does not apply to compelling a witness to provide a voice exemplar).
218 See Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 572-75 (discussing the compelled physical evidence cases).
219 Id. at 574.
220 CQ.id. at 575 (discussing the "focus upon whether the state operates upon a reluctant
witness's mental faculties to compel testimony").
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documents, in contrast, may be an extortion of truthful information
concerning the "four potential statements that adhere to the act of
production-existence, possession, authenticity, and the belief that the
produced documents match the subpoena's terms.""

3.

The D.C. Circuit's Testimonial Value Test.

Having established the two foundations of its Fifth Amendment
foregone conclusion' analysis-(i) the extent to which the government
already possesses information about the existence, location, and
authenticity of the subpoenaed documents at the time the subpoena was
issued,m and (ii) the degree to which the government is relying upon
compelled truthtelling by the witness to obtain information, 221-the court
set out the legal standard for "assessing the testimonial value of an act of
production."' The court formulated its standard as follows:
In light of Fisher,Doe 1, and Doe II, we conclude that the
testimonial value varies directly with the quantum of
information that the government seeks to extract through
compelling the expression of the contents of an individual's
mind and inversely with the quantum of information in the
government's possession at the time the relevant subpoena
issues .226
221 See id.
222 The court was very precise in its dissection of the various aspects of Fifth Amendment
analysis. It distinguished analysis of "the testimonial value" of the act of producing documents from
"the question of whether the act of producing documents in response to a subpoena is testimonial."
Id. at 576 n.31 ("The foregone conclusion analysis, which examines the testimonial value of the
accuseds' act of production, has nothing to do with the general question of whether the act of
producing documents in response to a subpoena is testimonial. Fisher,Doe I, and Braswell all teach
that it is.").
223 See supra text accompanying notes 193-201.
224 See supra text accompanying notes 212-21.
225 Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 575.
226 Id. (footnote omitted). The court's footnote to this statement added the following point:
The former constitutes the more important formulation, as it ties
testimonial value directly to the disparity between the government's knowledge
and that of the subpoenaed party. It focuses directly upon the government's
need to access the contents of an individual's mind. By contrast, although the
government may have little information with respect to whether a suspect's
DNA or fingerprints match those of a suspected culprit, and the government
will extract a great deal of information from a blood sample or a handwriting
exemplar, neither probes the contents of one's mind to compel testimony.
Everything of evidentiary value traces to the body as a source "real," as
opposed to communicative, evidence.
Id. at n.30. This footnote emphasized the importance to the court's analysis of the amount of
information the government has about the existence and location of the subpoenaed documents, an
analytical approach that Professor Nagareda has criticized as inappropriate for a Fifth Amendment
analysis. See supra note 194.
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This standard has two important qualities. First, it is consistent

with Fisher's admonition that the act of production doctrine should be
applied based upon "the facts and circumstances of particular cases or
classes thereof." 7 Second, and consistent with the Fisher "facts and

circumstances" approach, it necessitates a careful review by the court of
the knowledge the government has at the time the subpoena is issued.

8

Not surprisingly, the D.C. Circuit concluded that this approach forecloses
any analysis of whether a particular act of production has testimonial
value based upon categories of information. "

Rather than simply

defining categories of information and then asserting that some documents
within those categories must exist-an approach the Independent Counsel
proposed and the D.C. Circuit rejected as "hing[ing] on tautology"'°-a

more precise judicial inquiry is required. This left the D.C. Circuit
facing the task that the Supreme Court has appeared to want to avoid
since deciding Fisher: articulating a test for when an act of production
of documents has sufficient testimonial value to merit Fifth Amendment
protection.
The D.C. Circuit did not shrink from this task. It also did not
hide behind vague, "metaphysical" 2 concepts. The test it announced
was firmly grounded in an established legal concept ("reasonable

particularity") and was consistent with the approach taken by a sister
circuit:
Recognizing that the inquiry will always be highly contextual and
fact-intensive, we agree with the Second Circuit that the government
must establish its knowledge of the existence, possession, and
authenticity of the subpoenaed documents with "reasonable
particularity" before the communication inherent in the act of production
can be considered a foregone conclusion. 23'
227 See Fisher v.United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976).
228 Cf. Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 578 (employing the heading "Assessing the Government's
Knowledge" for the court's analysis of "the extent of the knowledge that the government must have
in order to justify a conclusion that the communicative aspects of the act of production are a
'foregone conclusion'").
229 See id. On this point the court looked beyond traditional legal authorities for support,
turning to scholarship in philosophy for explanation of the limitations inherent in the use of categories
to define specific information.
See id. (citing LUDwIG WI'rGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1968)).
230 Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 579.
231 See supraPart I.B.4. (discussing the Supreme Court's failure to articulate a test or provide
other meaningful guidance to the lower courts as to when an act of production of documents is
sufficiently testimonial to merit Fifth Amendment protection).
232 Alito, supra note 8, at 59; see also Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 579 n.34, 601 (Williams, Cir. J.,
dissenting).
233 Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 579 (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 1 F.3d 87, 93
(2d Cir. 1993)).
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This test is clear2 34-courts and litigants know what "reasonable
particularity" means-and it places an appropriately heavy burden 235 on
the government in overcoming the assertion of a Fifth Amendment
privilege for the act of producing documents, as evidenced by the D.C.
Circuit's application of its test in the Hubbell case.
4.

Application of the D.C. Circuit's Testimonial
Value Test in Hubbell.

In applying this test to the Hubbell case, the D.C. Circuit
provided guidance as to the care and precision with which a court must
assess "the extent of the government's knowledge as to the existence,
possession or control, and authenticity of the subpoenaed documentsi.e., the testimonial components of the act of production."236 The court
pointed out that this inquiry differs from the "conceptually separate and
temporally subsequent Kastigar inquiry,"237 a point that the district court
had failed to recognize in its analysis of the case. The district court had
"improperly conflated" the two inquiries by including the content of the
documents,2 3 as opposed to their existence and location, in its act of
production analysis.23 9
This point merits careful consideration because the D.C. Circuit
in Hubbell employed a far more precisely calibrated approach to Fifth
Amendment analysis than any other post-Fisherjudicial decision. Under
the D.C. Circuit approach, two separate and independent inquiries must
be undertaken by a court when a witness asserts the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination for a production of documents and is
subsequently immunized and compelled to product those documents. The
first analysis, which the court called "the Fisher/DoeI inquiry," assesses
whether the act of producing documents "[has] sufficient testimonial
value to invoke the Fifth Amendment's protections." 24 To use the
terminology of Fisher, this inquiry will determine whether or not the
234 See Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 579 n.34 (disputing the dissenting judge's assertion that the
majority's test would "largely turn on district courts' discretion in this metaphysical classification of
prosecutors' knowledge").
235 See generally JOHN M. BURKHOFF, SEARCH WARRANT LAW DESKBOOK, §§ 9.1, 9.5 (West
1997) (discussing the constitutional particularity requirement for search warrant descriptions of
"things to be seized" and the application of that requirement to documentary evidence).
236 Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 580.
237 Id.
238 As the D.C. Circuit explained, "The [district court's] inquiry should have focused upon
whether the government knew that the documents existed at all, and not upon whether the
government knew of the existence of the information contained therein." Id.

239 See id.
240 Id.
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existence and location of the subpoenaed documents is a "foregone
conclusion"; if so, then the act of production is not protected by the Fifth
Amendment. The focus of this inquiry is what the government knows at
the time the subpoena is issued about the documents (or other subpoenaed
materials) that are in the possession or under the control of the witness.24
In this inquiry, the burden is on the prosecution to "demonstrat[e] with
reasonable particularity a prior awareness" that the subpoenaed
documents existed and were in the possession or control of the witness.24

The D.C. Circuit's opinion makes clear that it is not sufficient to have a
general belief that a witness possesses a particular category of
documents; 243 the government must show it knew that particular
documents existed and were in a particular location prior to issuance of
the subpoena, as was the case in Fisher, in order to meet the foregone
conclusion test.2'

The key to this aspect of the D.C. Circuit's Fifth Amendment
analysis is an understanding that the "reasonable particularity" test is
unrelated to the Kastigar use and derivative use immunity test,24 which
must be satisfied before a witness can be prosecuted after being granted
immunity.246 The reasonable particularity test is concerned only with a
comparison between the factual circumstances at the time the subpoena is
issued and those that exist at the time of the witness's act of production;
the test compares what the government "knew" when it issued the
subpoena to what it "learned" from the witness's act of production. If the
government "learns" information from the act of production itself, then
the Fifth Amendment is implicated, and the witness cannot be compelled
to produce the subpoenaed documents without a grant of immunity. In
this manner, the "reasonable particularity" test precedes the immunity
grant (as well as the Kastigaranalysis that is required if the government
seeks to prosecute an immunized witness), and as a practical matter,
actually applies to the question of whether or not the prosecution must
seek an immunity order to compel a witness to comply with a
subpoena.247 If the government can meet the reasonable particularity test
241 See id. at 581.
242 Id.

243 See id. at 578-79.
244 See id. at 581.
245 See supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
246 The effect of Hubbell's immunity grant is discussed at infra Part H.B.2.
247 In this regard, the "reasonable particularity" test is most like the question of whether or
not a particular testimonial response (whether in the form of testimony or production of documents or
other tangible evidence) is sufficiently incriminating to implicate the protections of the Fifth
Amendment. The D.C. Circuit addressed this issue in a separate subsection of its Hubbell opinion.
See Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 581-82. The court applied the test from Hoffman v. United States, 341

U.S. 479 (1951), noting that "[w]ith respect to a subpoena for documents, the privilege cannot be
invoked merely because the subpoenaed items contain incriminating information; the act of
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by showing that the particular documents (but not general categories of
documents)24 exist and are in the possession or control of the witness,

then the act of production does not have sufficient testimonial value to
warrant Fifth Amendment protection. In that case, the witness need not
be granted immunity, and instead the court presumably should grant a
prosecution motion to compel compliance with the subpoena if the witness
refuses to produce the subpoenaed documents.
5.

The Effect of the Immunity Grant in Hubbell.

In the Hubbell case, the Office of Independent Counsel had
already sought and obtained an immunity order, and had then used the
information contained in the subpoenaed documents to prepare an
indictment against Hubbell.249 The indictment of the witness who had
produced documents under a grant of act of production use and derivative

use immunity required the D.C. Circuit to address the application of the
Kastigar test to the situation?

°

In its assessment, the court emphasized

that, under Kastigar, "a grant of immunity must provide protection
commensurate with that afforded by the privilege, [although] it need not
be broader." 1 In applying this teaching the D.C. Circuit made its

second major contribution to Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.
In its Kastigar analysis, the D.C. Circuit addressed a conceptual
argument that had been proposed in a 1986 law review article 2 written
by the Department of Justice prosecutor who had argued and lost the Doe

I case' 3 before the Supreme Court. This argument, in a nutshell, is that
production must communicate and incriminate." Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 581. The court compared the
Hubbell subpoena to the one issued in Doe I, where the witness's act of production would tacitly
admit the documents' existence and his control over them, and could provide a source of
authentication, and, therefore, was incriminating. See id. at 581-82. The court concluded that
"Hubbell faced a real and substantial threat of incrimination in responding" to the subpoena, but left
it to the district court to determine on remand "to what extent that testimony is incriminating." Id. at
582. Thus both the reasonable particularity test and the Hoffman incrimination test apply at the time
a fifth amendment act of production privilege is asserted, and only if both of those tests are resolved
in favor of the witness is an immunity grant necessary to compel production of the subpoenaed
documents. If the government can prevail on either of these tests, then presumably the court should
grant a motion to compel by the government and require compliance with the subpoena without any
grant of immunity.
248 See supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text.
249 See Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 565.
250 See id. at 582-85.
251 Id. at 583 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972)) (alteration in
original).
252 See Alito, supra note 8, at 59-60 (suggesting that one "envision the records materializing
in the grand jury room as if by magic"); see also Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 602 (Williams, Cir. .J.,
dissenting); Greg Sergienko, United States v. Hubbell: Encryption and the Discovery of Documents,
7 RicH. J.L. & TECH. 31 (2001).
253 See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 606 (1986) ("Samuel A. Alito, Jr., argued the
case for the United States.').
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the requirements of Kastigar are satisfied in an act of production
immunity case so long as the government acts as if "the documents in
Under this approach, the
question just appeared on it doorstep.""
prosecution can make no reference at trial as to how or by whom the
documents were produced, but it can make full use of both the documents
themselves and the information they contain."s The D.C. Circuit firmly
and categorically rejected this "manna from heaven" 256 argument as
"essentially eviscerat[ing] the act of production doctrine, as well as the
Fifth Amendment protection it secures." 57
In rejecting the "manna from heaven" argument, the court
focused on the government's knowledge of existence and possession of
the subpoenaed documents. In cases where the government has little or
no information about the existence or possession of the documents at the
time the subpoena is issued, the magical appearance hypothetical does not
account for all the information communicated to the government by the
act of production. The court analogized to a hypothetical case in which
all the residents of a large apartment building where a murder victim had
been stabbed to death are granted act of production immunity and
compelled to produce all knives in their possession or control. 8 A knife
produced by one of the immunized residents proves to be the murder
weapon, and the government seeks to use the knife, as well as
fingerprints and traces of blood on the knife, to prosecute its owner. In
that situation, "where the government had no evidentiary knowledge
independent of that derived, directly and indirectly, from testimony
communicated through compelled production, Fisher, Doe I, Doe II,
Kastigar, and Braswell clearly repudiate any attempt" to use the knife,
blood, or fingerprints to prosecute the owner.25 9
The D.C. Circuit's strong rejection of the manna from heaven
argument is one of two very significant contributions of its Hubbell
opinion to the "abstract and under-determined area of law" 260that is the
post-Fisher act of production doctrine. The other contribution is the
"reasonable particularity" test, which at last provides a yardstick for
measuring whether an act of production of documents has sufficient
testimonial value to be protected by the Fifth Amendment (as was the
254 See Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 583.
255 Id. ("Provided that the government does not mention the mechanics through which
it obtained those documents, and that the documents are sufficiently self-explanatory and selfreferential to establish their own nexus with the defendant, the government would be free to use the
subpoenaed documents in maling its case against the defendant.") (footnote omitted).
256 Id. at 585.

257 Id. at 583.
258 See id. at 584.
259 Id. at 584.
260 Id. at 570.
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case in Doe 1) or, alternatively, only communicates information that is a
"foregone conclusion" and, therefore, not protected (as was the case in
Fisher). Although the D.C. Circuit is to be commended for answering
these two important questions, which the Supreme Court might be said to

have studiously avoided addressing for decades, its Hubbell opinion is not
the last word on the subject. An evaluation of the significance of the
D.C. Circuit's answers to these important questions requires a careful
analysis of the Supreme Court's opinion affirming the D.C. Circuit's

decision in Hubbell.
B.

The Supreme Court's Analysis in Hubbell.

Like the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court focused on the effect
of the immunity grant as the key analytical factor in the Hubbell case.261
Before addressing the immunity issue, the Court distinguished the HoltSchmerber-Gilbert-Wadeline of "physical characteristics" cases262 and the
line of cases involving required compliance with a regulatory reporting
requirement. 263 The Court also acknowledged that under Fisher and Doe
I a witness cannot refuse to produce subpoenaed documents "merely
because the demanded documents containol incriminating evidence,
whether written by others or voluntarily prepared by himself." 21 The
Court then turned to the more difficult question of whether an act of

261 See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 33 (2000) ("[W]e granted the Independent
Counsel's petition for a writ of certiorari in order to determine the precise scope of a grant of
immunity with respect to the production of documents in response to a subpoena."); see also supra
notes 170-79 and accompanying text (noting that the immunity grant distinguished Hubbell from
Fisher and Doe I and necessitated more detailed analysis of the consequences of the act of producing
documents in response to a subpoena).
262 See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 35 (citing Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 594-98 (1990))
(proposing that "[tihe act of exhibiting such physical characteristics is not the same as a sworn
communication by a witness that relates either express or implied assertions of fact or belief"); see
also 2000 WL 230520 at 32 (John W. Nields, Jr., Esq., oral argument on behalf of respondent
Hubbell) (distinguishing the Schmerber blood sample, as well as the voice and handwriting exemplar
cases and stating that "the point about Schmerber is that the witness there could be the biggest liar or
the biggest truth-teller in the world, and the Government will get the same blood. It is not relying on
the truth-telling of the person at all"). For conflicting views of the significance of Schmerber and the
Supreme Court's other physical characteristics cases, compare Amar & Lettow, supra note 28, at
883-889 and Yale Kamisar, On the "Fruits" of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and
Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REv. 929, 956-68 (1995).
263 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 35 (citing United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927); Shapiro v.
United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948); California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971); Baltimore City Dept. of
Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549 (1990)). For a critical analysis of the required records
cases, see Amar & Lettow, supranote 28, at 869-73.
264 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 36.
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production has "a compelled testimonial aspect"265 that is protected by the
Fifth Amendment.266
1.

The Court Again Declines to Articulate a Testimonial Value Test.

Unlike the D.C. Circuit, however, the Supreme Court made no
effort to provide a test of general application for whether a particular act
of production of documents is sufficiently testimonial in nature to be
protected by the Fifth Amendment. As in Fisher and its other act of
production cases,267 the Court focused only on the facts of the case before
it. Also unlike the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court appears to have been
unconcerned with the need to distinguish the act of production analysis
from what the D.C. Circuit called "the conceptually separate and
temporally subsequent Kastigar inquiry."26 ' Instead, the Supreme Court
discussed Hubbell's act of production immunity269 before it addressed
whether Hubbell's act of production was testimonial in nature.2 7 The
Court reviewed the nature and scope of use and derivative use
immunity,27 1 and emphasized the "affirmative duty [imposed] on the
prosecution" to demonstrate that all the evidence to be used against the
accused was "derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the
compelled testimony."272 Only after framing the issue in terms of the
immunity grant and its consequences did the court address what it
identified as "the disagreement between the parties" in Hubbell: the
significance of the testimonial aspect of the act of production.273
In sharp contrast to the D.C. Circuit's lengthy and theoretical
Hubbell opinion,274 the Supreme Court employed a practical, commonsense analysis to gauge the testimonial value of Hubbell's act of
producing the subpoenaed documents. The Court first looked at the text

265 See id.

266 The Court also recognized that under Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951), the
Fifth Amendment protects against compelled communication of any information that would furnish a
link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the witness. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 38. Any
compelled testimony "that may 'lead to incriminating evidence' is privileged even if the information

itself is not inculpatory." Id. (quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 208 n.6 (1988)).
267 See Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 554-56; United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 613-14 (1984).
268 See generally United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 580 (1999), aff'd., 530 U.S. 27, 46
(2000).
269 The immunity grant is discussed in Part M1I
of the Court's opinion, Hubbell, 530 U.S. at
38-40.
270 The nature of Hubbell's act of production and the possible application of the Fisher
"foregone conclusion" doctrine are discussed in Part IV of the Court's opinion, id. at 40-46.

271 See id. at 44-45 (discussing use and derivative use immunity in greater detail).
272 Id. at 40 (quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972)).

273 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 40.
274 United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552 (1999), aff'd., 530 U.S. 27, 46 (2000).
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of the subpoena itself.2 75 It was clear to the Court that the prosecution
needed Hubbell's assistance "both to identify potential sources of
information and to produce those sources. 276 The Court emphasized the
breadth of the description of the eleven categories of information sought
by the subpoena and compared Hubbell's efforts in identifying and
producing the large volume of documents responsive to a general
category set out in the "Subpoena Rider" to answering either a detailed
written interrogatory or a series of oral questions at a discovery
deposition. 2 " The Court was careful, however, to distinguish between
the information that Hubbell had provided through the act of producing
the documents, on the one hand, and the information that the contents of
those documents provided, on the other hand. "Entirely apart from the
contents . . . providing a catalog of existing documents" in response to
the categories sought in the subpoena had sufficient testimonial value for
Hubbell to invoke the protections of the Fifth Amendment.2 7
2.

Implications of the Supreme Court's Decision in Hubbell.

This aspect of the Court's Hubbell analysis alone is noteworthy
for what it portends for future use of grand jury subpoenas duces tecum
to obtain documents and other physical evidence from targets and subjects
of investigations. The subpoena directed to Webster Hubbell was hardly
unique in either its breadth of categories of documents sought or the
generality of the description of those categories. To the contrary, the
terms "any and all documents," "reflecting, referring, or relating,"
"direct or indirect," "including but not limited to," and the like are
standard boilerplate subpoena language. These extremely broad and allinclusive terms are routinely applied to numerous categories of business
and financial documents and records in white collar criminal
investigations. The quantity of documents (13,120 pages) that Hubbell
produced in response to the subpoena also does not distinguish his case
from many other grand jury investigations; witnesses routinely produce
large quantities of documents in white collar criminal investigations.
275 See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 41. The importance of the text of the subpoena to the Court's
analysis is demonstrated by the fact that the Court chose to publish as an appendix to its opinion the
entire text of the "Subpoena Rider" that describes the eleven categories of documents Hubbell was

required to produce. See id. at 46-49.
276 See id. at 41.
277 See id. at 41-42. The Court illustrated this point by referring to the category from the
subpoena rider calling for the production of "any and all documents reflecting, referring, or relating
to any direct or indirect sources of money or other things of value received by or provided to"
Hubbell or his family members during a three-year period. See id. at 41 (quoting from category A of
the Subpoena Rider attached as Appendix to the Opinion of the Court, id. at 46).

278 See id. at 42.
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Finally, the Court's conclusion that identifying and producing the
documents "fitting within any of the 11 broadly worded subpoena

categories" 279 has testimonial value would remain true even if the
subpoena called for only a single category. 280

The point of these

observations has enormous ramifications-a witness can assert the act of
production privilege in response to the kind of grand jury subpoena duces

tecum that is routinely used in white collar criminal investigations.
The Court's analysis in Hubbell confirms this point. The Court
rejected the government's "manna from heaven" 281 argument and

emphasized the "truth-telling" involved in responding to the subpoena.282
In recognizing the truth-telling that is inherent in the act of producing
documents in response to a subpoena, Justice Stevens returned to the
strongbox key/wall safe combination analogy he first suggested twelve
years earlier in his Doe II dissent. 283 In Hubbell, however, Justice
Stevens was writing for the majority, and he used the opportunity to
dismiss the government's efforts to use his strongbox key/wall safe

combination analogy to minimize the protection afforded by the act of
production doctrine. 28' The Hubbell opinion makes it crystal-clear that,
contrary to the government's assertions, "[t]he assembly of those
documents was like telling an inquisitor the combination to a wall safe,
not like being forced to surrender the key to a strongbox."285 Thus the
court effectively dismissed both the "manna from heaven" and the
"strongbox key" arguments and recognized that production of documents

279 Id.
280 Although an obvious point, it merits emphasis that the Fifth Amendment problem
presented by the subpoena directed to Hubbell, with its eleven categories of documents, cannot be
solved by simply issuing eleven separate subpoenas each calling for one category of information.
The mental effort, which has been descirbed as "the functional equivalent of the preparation of an
answer to either a detailed written interrogatory or a series of oral questions at a discovery
deposition," required to identify and produce the particular documents that are responsive to a given
category is the same in both cases. See id. at 41-42.
281 Id. at 42.
282 Id. The Court cited Professor Stuntz's article, Self-incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 1227, 1228-29, 1256-59, 1277-79 (1988), as "discussing the conceptual link between truthtelling and the privilege in the document production context," and JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2264 at 379 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961), as "describing a subpoena
duces tecum as 'process relying on the witness'] [sic] moral responsibility for truthtelling.'"
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 42 n.23.
283 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43 (citing Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 n.9). Justice
Stevens used the strongbox key/wall safe combination analogy in his Doe II dissent, see id. at 219,
and the Doe II majority responded in the note Justice Stevens cites in Hubbell, see id. at 210 n.9.
284 See 2000 WL 230520 at 8 (U.S. Oral Argument of Ronald J. Mann) ("If what we do is we
tell the defendant give us the key to the strong box, it's full of incriminating documents, the answer is
he has to give us the key. If we tell him, tell us the combination to the safe, we can't make him do
that.").
285 See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43.
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in response to a subpoena requires both "mental and physical steps ' 2 16
and "truth-telling, 287 by the witness.
This recognition of the "truth-telling" inherent in responding to a
subpoena duces tecum suggests an even broader potential application of
the act of production privilege: The same truth-telling is required
whether the witness is producing thousands of pages of documents, as in
the Hubbell case, or a single, one-page document specifically described in
a subpoena. In both instances, the government relies on the truth-telling
of the witness to admit the existence of the document(s) and produce the
document(s) in response to the subpoena. The testimonial nature of the
act of production is the same in both cases, and, arguably, the privilege
against self-incrimination should apply to the act of production in both
cases.
The difference between the two cases, if any, arises out of the
application of the "foregone conclusion" doctrine.2 88 If the government
can show that existence, possession, and authenticity are a foregone
conclusion, then the witness's assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination can be overridden and the production can be
compelled without a grant of immunity. The D.C. Circuit's "reasonable
particularity" test in its Hubbell opinion provides a means of applying the
foregone conclusion doctrine. 289 It clearly will be easier for the
government to meet the reasonable particularity test in the single
document case, as opposed to the broad categories of documents case, but
in both instances the burden is on the government to present evidence that
the document(s) sought exists and is in the possession of the witness.290
Up to this point in its opinion, the Hubbell Court had gone quite
far in clarifying Fifth Amendment doctrine.
It had rejected the
government's assertion that a "manna from heaven" approach could be
used to allow the government to make use of the contents of documents so
long as the act of production itself is not introduced into evidence at
trial. 2 9' It also had made clear that selection of documents that fit a
general category described in a subpoena is testimonial in nature because
it requires a "truthful reply" by the witness.2 As such, it is not "a mere
physical act that is principally non-testimonial in character" and is "like
telling an inquisitor the combination to a wall safe, not like being forced

286 See id.at 42.
287 See id. at n.23.
288 See infra notes 291-94 and accompanying text.
289 See United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 579-80 (1999), aff'd., 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
290 See id.at 581 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461-62 (1972); Braswell v.
United States, 487 U.S. 99, 117 (1988)).
291 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 42.
292 Id.
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to surrender the key to a strongbox." 2" These points resolve significant
uncertainties in the application of the Fifth Amendment to document
subpoenas. Unfortunately, however, on the most difficult and uncertain
point-the question of when the foregone conclusion doctrine applies to
an act of production of documents-the Court once again declined to
provide a definitive answer.
In addressing the foregone conclusion issue, the Court reverted to
the approach it had taken in Fisher and Doe I, deciding the case based
upon the facts before the Court without articulating any more general test
for application in future cases. The Independent Counsel had argued for
a per se rule that the production of "ordinary business records" is never
sufficiently testimonial to warrant Fifth Amendment protection because
"the existence and possession of such records by any businessman is a
'foregone conclusion' under Fisher."294 The Court rejected this argument
as misreading Fisher and ignoring Doe 1295 While the Court declined to
define "the scope of this 'foregone conclusion' rationale," it concluded
that "the facts of this case plainly fall outside of it."296 The reasoning
behind that conclusion is considerably more succinct than that of the D.C.
Circuit in its Hubbell opinion, and although the opinion stops short of
explicitly adopting the "reasonable particularity" test put forward by the
D.C. Circuit, it nonetheless is sufficient to answer the most important
question about the foregone conclusion doctrine.
The Court decided that the foregone conclusion did not apply in
the Hubbell case by comparing the facts of that case to the facts of Fisher.
In Fisher, the government knew or could confirm the location and
existence of the subpoenaed documents without any assistance from the
individual who was asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to
the documents. The facts of Hubbell were different. In what may well
be the most important sentence of the Hubbell opinion, the Court
identified the crucial difference: "here the Government has not shown
that it had any prior knowledge of either the existence or the whereabouts

293 Id.

294 Id. at 44 (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976)); see also 1999 WL
1072535 at 33-34 (0IC brief) ("Because the subpoena in this case, like the subpoena in Fisher, called

only for specified categories of ordinary business records, the decision in Fishercalls for the same
conclusion here: The subpoena compelled respondent to make no communication that rises to the
level of testimony within the protection of the Fifth Amendment."); 1999 WL 1076136 at 29 (DOJ

amicus brief) ("Thus, Fisher's 'foregone conclusion' test focuses on broader categories of documents,
and not on the individual documents that may fall within the specifications of a subpoena. As applied
to an individual who is or was engaged in business, the test would therefore defeat any effort to
invoke the Fifth Amendment to resist compliance with a subpoena for ordinary business records...
295 See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 44.
296 Id.
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of the 13,120 pages of documents ultimately produced by respondent." 2"
By recognizing the extent of the Government's prior knowledge as the
critical inquiry for purposes of the application of the foregone conclusion
doctrine, the Court effectively resolved the issue of when that doctrine
should apply.
Although the Court did not adopt "reasonable particularity" as the
general standard for assessing the adequacy of the government's prior
knowledge, it at least made clear that it is the extent of that knowledge
that a court must weigh when deciding whether the foregone conclusion
test is applicable. In cases like Hubbell, where the government cannot
show "that it had any prior knowledge of either the existence or the
whereabouts" 298 of the subpoenaed documents, the foregone conclusion
doctrine applies, and the witness can assert the Fifth Amendment act of
production privilege and refuse to produce the subpoenaed documents. If
the government wishes to overcome the witness's Fifth Amendment
privilege, it must grant the witness act of production immunity. If the
government thereafter indicts the witness, it must be prepared to "prove
that the evidence it used in obtaining the indictment and propose[s] to use
at trial was derived from legitimate sources 'wholly independent' of the
testimonial aspect of respondent's immunized conduct in assembling and
producing the documents described in the subpoena."299 Consistent with
the D.C. Circuit's analysis, 3" this process as described by the Supreme
Court puts a heavy burden on the government at two distinct points: (1)
the initial showing that the foregone conclusion doctrine applies, through
demonstrating prior knowledge of the existence, location, and authenticity
of the particular documents (not categories of documents), and (2) the
subsequent Kastigar showing that all evidence used in obtaining the
indictment and proposed to be used at trial was obtained from
independent sources and was not in any way derived from the witness's
immunized act of production.
As discussed in Part V below, the Court's affirmance of these
two points raises important questions about the continued vitality and
significance of the Fisher "contents vs. act of production" distinction.
The Hubbell opinion will also have a major effect on the government's
ability to obtain documents and other physical evidence from subjects and
targets of grand jury investigations. In the post-Hubbell era, it is no
297 Id.
298 Id. at 45.

299 See id.
300 See United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 580 (1999), aff'd., 530 U.S. 27 (2000)
("However, when articulating these factual findings as to the Independent Counsel's knowledge of the
documents' existence-as is proper under Fisher and Doe 1-the district court improperly conflated
this FisherlDoe 1 inquiry with the conceptually separate and temporally subsequent Kastigar

inquiry.").
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longer clear that a grand jury subpoena is an easier means of obtaining
evidence than a search warrant for prosecutors investigating white-collar
crime. This issue is addressed in Part IV, before turning to the broader
theoretical implications of the Hubbell decision.
IV.

Post-Hubbell Comparison of Search Warrants and Grand Jury
Subpoenas as Means of Obtaining Documents in Criminal

Investigations.
Parts II and III above describe the decline of Boyd and the

development of the act of production doctrine from Fisher through
Hubbell. The Supreme Court's decision in Hubbell, with its clear
rejection of the prosecution's arguments for a limited interpretation of the
testimonial value of the act of producing documents in response to a
subpoena, invites a re-examination of Boyd and Fisher. The Boyd
decision has been widely criticized in the years since Fisher introduced
the testimonial communications analysis and the act of production
Both courts 301 and commentators 3 2 have criticized what
doctrine.
Professor Nagareda has aptly described as "the [Boyd] Court's conflation
of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments." 303 Notwithstanding these
criticisms of Boyd, however, the Court's Hubbell decision suggests that,

in many cases, the Fifth Amendment in effect will protect the contents of
private papers when the government subpoenas such documents from an
individual-a result that is arguably closer to a Boyd analysis than a
Fisher analysis. 3"
301 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-06 (1984); United States v. Doe, 465 U.S.
605, 610 n.8 (1984); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 472 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391, 405-14 (1976).
302 See Amar & Lettow, supra note 28, at 916; Akhll Reed Amar, FourthAmendment First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 757, 790 (1994); Krauss, supra note 1, at 190-211; Robert L.
Misner, In PartialPraise of Boyd: The Grand Jury as Catalystfor Fourth Amendment Change, 29
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 805, 811 n.37 (1997).
303 Nagareda, supra note 7, at 1585. Professor Nagareda criticizes Fisher and its progeny,
see id. at 1590-1603, and argues that compelling a person "to give evidence" (including production
of pre-existing documentary evidence) is to compel that person "to be a witness" in violation of the
Fifth Amendment, id. at 1603-39. Professor Nagareda's position was embraced by two Justices in
Hubbell, see Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 49 (concurring opinion of Justice Thomas, joined by Justice
Scalia), but the majority continued to employ the analytical focus on preexisting government
knowledge that Fisherintroduced with the "foregone conclusion doctrine," which Professor Nagareda
rejects as irrelevant to a principled fifth amendment analysis, see Nagareda, supra note 7, at 1596-99
(explaining what Professor Nagareda describes as "The Irrelevance of Preexisting Knowledge"). As
the Hubbell Court described this aspect of its analysis, "here the Government has not shown that it
had any prior knowledge of either the existence or the whereabouts of the 13,120 pages of documents
ultimately produced by respondent [Hubbell]." Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 45 (emphasis added).
304 Another commentator has recognized that Hubbell may move Fifth Amendment law back
toward Boyd and its "conflation" of the application of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to document
Professor Uviller believes that Hubbell's "approach confuses Fourth and Fifth
subpoenas.
Amendment rights and hints at a rebirth of the thoroughly discredited and deeply interred Boyd
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Professor Nagareda and others

5 have

noted that Boyd's treatment

of the compelled production of documents by the owner of those
documents as "the equivalent of a search and seizure ' 316 is no longer
valid.307 Although that point is beyond dispute, the net result of the
Court's decision in Hubbell is to limit the practical ability of prosecutors
both to compel production of documents and to use the contents of those
documents in prosecuting the witness who produced them. As a result,

prosecutors conducting criminal investigations may be more likely to use
search warrants, rather than subpoenas, to obtain documents from
individuals. This Part compares the application of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments to document subpoenas and search warrants, focusing on the
new insights provided by the Court's Hubbell decision.

A.

Fourth Amendment Search Warrant Requirements.

Under what one commentator has characterized as "the
conventional interpretation of the fourth amendment, 308 searches must be
conducted pursuant to a validly issued warrant except in those exceptional
situations where it would not be feasible to require the authorities to

obtain a warrant. 309 To obtain a warrant to search for documents, a
doctrine." See Uviller, supra note 23, at 321. In an effort "to avoid the grim doctrinal consequence
of applying the right against compelled self-incrimination to the inculpatory contents of subpoenaed
documents," Professor Uviller asserts that Fisher'sprotections should extend only to "express use of
the fact of compliance alone"; in other words, the prosecution should free to make use of the contents
of the documents produced so long as it makes no explicit reference to the physical act of production.
Id. The problem with this approach is that while it might help resolve the tension between Fisherand
Hubbell, it is virtually indistinguishable from the argument put forth by the Independent Counsel and
squarely rejected by an eight-member majority of the Court in Hubbell. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 4243.
305 See supra note 300.
306 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886).
307 Professor Nagareda points out that "the Fourth and Fifth Amendments ultimately are not
about end results; instead, they articulate two very different sorts of restraints upon two distinct
means of information gathering by the government in the criminal process." Nagareda, supra note 7,
at 1587. Professor Nagareda goes on to argue that the Fifth Amendment should prevent the
government from compelling an individual to produce self-incriminatory documents except where the
government either (1) has sufficient information to obtain a search warrant for the documents, or (2)
grants use immunity with respect to the documents themselves and any derivative fruits. Id. at 164041. This conception of the nature of the protection provided by the Fifth Amendment is consistent
with this Article's interpretation of the implications of the Supreme Court's decision in Hubbell. See
supra Part II.B.2.
308 Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRiM. L.
REV. 257, 281-82 (1984); see also Stuart C. Berman, Student Fourth Amendment Rights: Defining
the Scope of the T.L.O. School-Search Exception, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1077, 1084 (1991); Nadine
Strossen, Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz: A Roadblock to Meaningful Judicial
Enforcement of ConstitutionalRights, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 285, 351 (1991).
309 See id. at 282; see also Wayne D. Holly, The Fourth Amendment Hangs in the Balance:
Resurrectingthe WarrantRequirement Through Strict Scrutiny, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 531,
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prosecutor must satisfy the probable cause and particularity requirements

of the Fourth Amendment. 310 The Supreme Court has declined to
articulate a precise definition of probable cause, noting instead that
"probable cause is a fluid concept-turning on the assessment of

probabilities in particular factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully,
reduced to a neat set of legal rules." 311 Although it has not provided a
precise definition, the Court has described "probable cause to search as
existing where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to

warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found." 312 This standard, however imprecise,
is clearly a greater showing than that required to uphold the issuance of a
grand jury subpoena duces tecum,313 such as the one issued to Webster
Hubbell by Independent Counsel Starr. The standard for upholding grand

jury subpoenas is that the subpoena not be unreasonably burdensome to
its target.314 Accordingly, if prosecutors were required to show probable

cause in order to obtain documents, some documents that now are
routinely obtained by issuing a grand jury subpoena duces tecum would
be unavailable to prosecutors investigating white-collar crime.315
536-37 (1997). A discussion of the various exceptions to the warrant requirement is not relevant to
this Article, but for a description of those exceptions, see Kathryn A. Buckner, Note, School Drug
Tests: A FourthAmendment Perspective, 1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 275, 280-92 (1987).
310 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also JEROLD H. ISRAEL ET AL., WHITE COLLAR CRIME:

LAW AND PRACTICE 633 (1996) ("To obtain a warrant authorizing a search for documents, a
prosecutor must persuade a federal magistrate that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has
been committed and that specific documents which would constitute evidence of the crime can be
found in a particular place (typically a business office or residence).").
311 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). Professor Wasserstrom has noted that, "In
view of the centrality of the probable cause requirement to both the theory and practice of fourth
amendment law, it is perhaps surprising that the Supreme Court has never tried to explain its precise
meaning." Wasserstrom, supra note 308, at 305 (footnote omitted). The Gates Court did provide
some further precision in a footnote: "As discussed previously, probable cause requires only a
probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity." Gates,
462 U.S. at 243 n.13.
312 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (internal citation omitted).
313 As discussed in more detail below, see infra notes 322-31 and accompanying text, in Hale
v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), the Supreme Court declined to impose a probable cause requirement
for issuance of a grand jury subpoena. More recently, the Court has made clear that a grand jury
subpoena should be upheld unless there is no reasonable possibility that it will lead to discovery of
relevant evidence. See United States v. R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991). As Professor
Stuntz has observed: "Once Hale cast aside probable cause, nothing in Fourth Amendment law
allowed courts to cabin the subpoena power, to treat it as an exceptional tool for use when ordinary
tools will not work. The upshot was an almost limitless subpoena power." SUmtz, supra note 18, at
860-61.
314 See id. at 857-58 (citing BEALE ETrAL., supra note 8, at 6-162 to 6-176. As Professor
Stuntz aptly and succinctly notes: "Few burdens are deemed unreasonable." Stuntz, supra note 18, at
858. The use of grand jury subpoenas to obtain documents is discussed at infra Part Il.B.
315 See Stuntz, supra note 18, at 859-60 (In white collar investigations, the government often
must examine documents and question witnesses before it can establish probable cause. .

.

. The

government may be able to generate enough evidence to raise some suspicion, but the evidence (and
the suspicion) will often be weak until witnesses have been called and documents examined. Thus, a
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The other Fourth Amendment requirement for issuance of a
search warrant-the "particularity" requirement 316 -is more closely
related to the Fifth Amendment concerns that occupied the Court in

Hubbell. The particularity requirement encompasses both an adequate
description of the particular place to be searched and the specific things to
be seized.317 Both of these requirements are implicated in a situation like
that of the Hubbell case, in which prosecutors wish to obtain documents

that may relate or refer to criminal activity, but are unsure about the
documents' location and even their existence. Although courts are
generally sympathetic to the special document needs of prosecutors
investigating white collar crime,318 a prosecutor in that situation would not
be able to meet the particularity requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. 1 9

probable cause standard for subpoenas would end many white-collar criminal investigations before
they had begun."). Professor Stuntz goes on to argue that "courts could require a showing of
probable cause, or something like it, as a condition of enforcing subpoenas." Id. at 864. He suggests
that subpoenas should be subject to judicial review upon filing of a motion to quash so that a court
can decide, before the subpoena is enforced, whether the seriousness of the particular crime under
investigation is sufficient to outweigh the invasion of privacy occasioned by enforcement of the
subpoena. Id. at 866-69.
316 See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927) ("The requirement that warrants
shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and
prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken,
nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.").
317 See, e.g., Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (explaining that "[b~y limiting
the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to
search, the [particularity] requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its
justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers
intended to prohibit") (citation omitted); see also Larry EchoHawk & Paul EchoHawk, Curing a
Search Warrant that Fails to ParticularlyDescribethe Place to be Searched, 35 IDAHO L. REv. 1, 3
(1998); Rosemarie A. Lynskey, Note, A Middle Ground Approach to the Exclusionary Remedy:
Reconciling the Redaction Doctrine with United States v. Leon, 41 VAND. L. REv. 811, 814 (1988).
318 See, e.g., United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1346 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating that
'effective investigation of complex white-collar crimes may require the assembly of a 'paper puzzle'
from a large number of seemingly innocuous pieces of individual evidence . . . [hence,] reading the
warrant with practical flexibility entails an awareness of the difficulty of piecing together the 'paper
puzzle'"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983); see also United States v. Regan, 706 F. Supp. 1102,
1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("The degree to which a warrant must state its terms with particularity varies
inversely with [the] complexity of the criminal activity investigated.").
319 At oral argument in the Hubbell case, in response to a question from the Court as to
whether the prosecution could have obtained a search warrant, John W. Nields, Jr., counsel to Mr.
Hubbell, stated that the prosecution had acknowledged on the record that they could not have
obtained a search warrant for the records they were seeking. See 2000 WL 230520 (U.S. Oral Arg.)
at 34.
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Use of Grand Jury Subpoenas to Obtain Documents.
The potential difficulties presented to the government by the

particularity and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment
make it understandable that prosecutors ordinarily prefer to obtain

documentary evidence through issuance of grand jury subpoenas32° rather
than by obtaining and executing search warrants.3 21 Prior to the Hubbell

decision, utilizing a grand jury subpoena duces tecum, augmented by a
grant of act of production immunity if the subpoena recipient asserted his
or her Fifth Amendment privilege, was clearly the best means for
prosecutors to obtain documentary evidence.

In the federal system, the

prosecutors, not the courts, control the issuance of grand jury subpoenas,
and even though the subpoenas are issued in the court's name and the
authority of the court can be invoked to enforce them, the court ordinarily
plays no role in their actual issuance. 3' In fact, federal prosecutors need

not even 3zobtain prior authorization from the grand jury to issue a
subpoena.
This broad discretionary power of federal prosecutors to issue
grand jury subpoenas was (at least up until the Hubbell decision) largely

unconstrained by constitutional limitations.

As discussed above, only

twenty years after deciding Boyd, the Court in Hale v. Henkel

324

320 It should be noted that compulsory production of testimonial and documentary evidence
though issuance of investigatory subpoenas is not an indispensable element of criminal law
enforcement. Unlike the federal system, many jurisdictions conduct police investigations without the
benefit of subpoena power, and in many kinds of cases this lack of subpoena power does not impair
criminal investigation and prosecution. Effective investigation of business and financial crimes (socalled "white-collar" crime), however, often requires use of compulsory process to obtain evidence.
See generally BEALE ET AL., supra note 8, at 6-2 to 6-3. For this reason, the potential effect of the
Supreme Court's Hubbell decision merits careful analysis.
321 In addition to the difficulties posed by the probable cause and particularity requirements,
search warrants ordinarily involve greater administrative costs than a subpoena duces tecum. See
generally ISRAELET AL., supra note 310, at 634-35. Moreover, the "exclusionary rule" remedy for
conducting an unconstitutional search can be far more damaging to a prosecutor's case than the
remedy for issuing an illegally overbroad subpoena, which is remedied by the court's granting a
motion to quash the subpoena. See id. On the other hand, the potential damage to prosecutions
posed by the exclusionary rule remedy for unconstitutional searches may well have been substantially
mitigated by the Court's decision in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), which adopted a
"reasonable good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule that permits introduction of evidence
obtained through use of a defective search warrant if the warrant was issued by a "detached and
neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause." Leon, 468 U.S. at
900, 913, 921. Whatever the effect of Leon on prosecutorial behavior (and some believe it has been
substantial, see, e.g., Steven Duke, Dialog:Making Leon Worse, 95 YALE L.J. 1405, 1412 (1986)),
the point remains that federal prosecutors ordinarily prefer to obtain documentary evidence by issuing
grand jury subpoenas rather than by obtaining and executing search warrants.
322 See BEALE ET AL., supranote 8, § 6:2 at 6-10.
323 Id. at 6-11.
324 201 U.S. 43 (1906). Hale also is significant for its holding that corporations cannot assert
a Fifth Amendment privilege. See Hale, 201 U.S. at 76-77 (stating that due to their special
"privileges and franchises" a corporation is not entitled to a Fifth Amendment privilege, but is
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effectively abandoned the concept of Fourth or Fifth Amendment
limitations on the scope of subpoenas. 3' Although the Hale court did
recognize that the Fourth Amendment imposes some limit on the
subpoena power, 32' and even concluded that the particular subpoena
before the Court was unreasonable because it was "far too sweeping in its
terms, 327 the Court largely dismissed the Boyd presumption that a
subpoena amounted to an unreasonable search and seizure. The Hale
Court, expressing concern about the administration of justice, 32 ' departed
from Boyd 329 by finding it "quite clear that the search and seizure clause
of the Fourth Amendment was not intended to interfere with the power of
the courts to compel, through a subpoena duces tecum, the production,
upon a trial in court, of documentary evidence. 33' This holding reflected

more law enforcement pragmatism 331 than constitutional principle 332 and
nonetheless protected by the general "reasonableness" requirement of the Fourth Amendment). Hale
and the "collective entity" cases that have expanded this holding thus limit the impact of the Court's
decision in Hubbell to cases involving individuals. Corporations, partnerships, and other collective
business entities, which cannot assert a Fifth Amendment privilege even for the act of production of
documents, therefore, will not be affected by the Hubbell decision. Moreover, as Hubbell's counsel
pointed out in oral argument before the Court, even in cases involving sole proprietorships, the
government usually can compel some other individual, such as a bookkeeper, secretary, or other
document custodian, to produce the subpoenaed documents. See 2000 WL 230520 (U.S. Oral Arg.)
at 30-31. This means that the impact of Hubbell is limited to those situations in which the subject of
an investigation is immunized and compelled to produce his or her private papers. Cf. id. at 31.
325 See BEALE ET AL., supra note 8, § 6:20 at 6-163; see also Stuntz, supra note 18, at 861
(describing the federal subpoena power after Hale as "almost limitless"), 864 (describing the federal
subpoena power as "something akin to a blank check).
326 See Hale, 201 U.S. at 76.
327 Id. See generally 2 JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 39:4 at 526-27 (2d
ed. 1982) (discussing the impact of Hale on fourth amendment law).
328 See Hale, 201 U.S. at 73.
329 See BEALE ET AL., supra note 8, § 6:20 at 6-163 ("The Court's decision [in Hale], while
purporting simply to interpret the Boyd case, was in fact a square rejection of the Fourth Amendment
analysis in Boyd, based on pragmatic considerations.").
330 Hale, 201 U.S. at 73. The Court's hesitance to use the Fourth Amendment to hinder law
enforcement's use of subpoenas to gather evidence may also have motivated the Court's later holding
in Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946). In that case, the Court held that a
subpoena duces tecum issued by an administrative agency should be upheld so long as (i)it was
issued "for a lawfully authorized purpose," (ii) "the documents sought are relevant to the inquiry,"
and (iii) the "specification of the documents to be produced [isladequate . . . for purposes of the
relevant inquiry." See Oklahoma Press, 327 U.S. at 208-09. Although Oklahoma Pressinvolved an
administrative subpoena, rather than a grand jury subpoena, its liberal standard for upholding
subpoenas is still cited with approval today. See HALL, supra note 327, § 39:4 at 528; see also
BEALE ET AL., supra note 8, § 6:20 at 6-164 (referring to Oklahoma Press as a "leading case").
331 See BEALE ET AL., supra note 8, § 6:20 at 6-163 ("The Court's decision [in Hale], while
purporting simply to interpret the Boyd case, was in fact a square rejection of the Fourth Amendment
analysis in Boyd, based on pragmatic considerations.").
332 Cf. Stuntz, supra note 18, at 859 (analyzing the Court's holding in Hale and describing the
"lax standard" employed by the Court as arising out of "substantive necessity"); see also Note, All
Quiet on the PaperFront:Asserting a Fifth Amendment Privilegeto Avoid Production of Corporate
Documents in In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated January 29, 1999, 46 VILL. L.
REv. 547, 554-57, 577 (2001) (describing the Court's approach in Hale and subsequent cases as
supported by the "white-collar rationale" defined by Peter J. Henning as "the notion that the rules of
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left the application of the Fourth Amendment to subpoenas somewhat
unsettled.3 33

That uncertainty remained through most of the twentieth century.
In 1991, the Supreme Court provided some further guidance on
prosecutors' power to issue document subpoenas in United States v. R.

Enterprises, Inc.334 In that case, a grand jury had subpoenaed business
records and videotapes from an adult entertainment company in
connection with an obscenity investigation. 33' The subpoenas were

challenged on a motion to quash, and on appeal, the Fourth Circuit held
that the government should be required to make a preliminary showing
that the subpoenaed materials would be admissible at trial and that the

targets of the investigation were subject to prosecution in the judicial
district where the subpoenas were issued.336 In reviewing the Fourth
Circuit's holding, the Supreme Court stressed the "unique role" of the
grand jury in our criminal justice system and the difference between
investigative grand jury subpoenas and trial subpoenas. 337 For these
reasons, the Court rejected imposition of relevance or admissibility

requirements338 on grand jury subpoenas.339 The Court concluded that
when a grand jury subpoena duces tecum is challenged on relevancy
grounds, the motion to quash must be denied "unless the district court
determines that there is no reasonable possibility that the materials sought
340
will produce information relevant to the grand jury's investigation. ,
non-white-collar crime cases involving the Fifth Amendment should not apply to complex economic
crimes"); Henning, supra note 19, at 416-18.
333 See 2 JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SmZURE § 39:4 at 527 & n.48 (2d ed.
1982) (citing Judge Friendly's observation in In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973), that Hale "left the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to subpoenas
duces tecum in a most confusing state").
334 498 U.S. 292 (1991).
335 Id. at294-95.
336 See In re Grand Jury 87-3 Subpoena Duces Tecum (Under Seal), 884 F.2d 772 (4th Cir.
1989), rev'd sub nom In re R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292 (1991). Commentators have noted
that such a requirement is very unusual for a grand jury subpoena, and that the Fourth Circuit may
have been motivated by concerns that the subpoenas could impinge upon First Amendment rights.
See also BEAL ET AL., supra note 8, § 6:21 at 6-173 to 6-176 (providing a detailed explanation of
the history of the R. Enterprisescase).
337 R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. at 297.
338 The Court was applying Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c), which governs the
issuance of subpoenas duces tecum in all federal criminal proceedings, including grand jury
subpoenas, and provides that "the court on motion may promptly quash or modify the subpoena if
compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive." R. Enterprises,498 U.S. at 299-300.
339 Id. at 298-99.
340 Id. at 301. This "no reasonable possibility" standard is made even broader by the Court's
admonition that the subpoenaed materials need only "produce" information relevant to the grand
jury's investigation, as opposed to a requirement that the materials themselves be relevant. See id.
This derivative relevance standard is more like the civil litigation discovery standard, see 8 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 26(b)(1) (1994), or
the "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence" civil litigation standard,
than the criminal jury trial standard announced by the Court in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
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With this backdrop in place, it is not surprising that at the time of

the Hubbell decision federal prosecutors viewed their power to issue
grand jury subpoenas as virtually unlimited. 34 1 Under the case law
developed by the Supreme Court since Boyd, neither the Fourth

Amendment nor the Fifth Amendment imposed any meaningful restraints
on the power of federal prosecutors to issue grand jury subpoenas.342 If

the recipient of a subpoena does not interpose Fourth Amendment
objections in the form of a motion to quash, which R. Enterprisesmakes
unlikely, or assert a Fifth Amendment privilege claim, which Fisher and
its progeny make unlikely, the prosecution ...can subpoena any
information it wishes to obtain without regard to issues such as cost of
compliance or invasion of personal privacy. 3"
C.

Grants of Act of Production Immunity in Document Subpoena
Cases.
Prior to the Hubbell decision, another factor contributed to the

enormous power of federal prosecutors to use grand jury subpoenas to
obtain information about subjects of criminal investigations. Even an
(1974) (imposing relevancy, admissibility, and specificity requirements on a criminal trial subpoena).
See also R. Enterprises,498 U.S. at 299.
341 At oral argument in Hubbell, the Independent Counsel's office characterized the R.
Enterprises standard as "not difficult for grand juries to satisfy," see 2000 WL 230520 (U.S. Oral
Arg.) at 6, and said that under R. Enterprises, "having a hunch is more or less what the standard
[for an enforceable grand jury subpoena] is," id. at 14. Cf.Stuntz, supra note 18, at 860-61 ("Once
Hale cast aside probable cause, nothing in Fourth Amendment law allowed courts to cabin the
subpoena power, to treat it as an exceptional tool for use when ordinary tools will not work. The
upshot was an almost limitless subpoena power.").
342 Professor Uviller has clearly and succinctly described the pre-Hubbell conception of the
broad powers of prosecutors to use subpoenas duces tecum to "fish for evidence of crime." Uviller,
supra note 23, at 323 ("Indeed, prosecutors-and the grand juries they lead-are supposed to go
fishing. They are supposed to enlighten themselves by the product of their subpoenas. There is no
requirement that they know what they will get before they ask for it."). As discussed below, the
holding in Hubbell obviously raises significant questions as to the continued vitality of this broad
conception of prosecutors' power to use subpoenas duces tecum to engage in "fishing expeditions."
Uviller, supra note 23, at 323 (explaining that federal prosecutors managing a grand jury
investigation need not obtain approval from the grand jury or the court before issuing a subpoena in
the name of the court).
343 In this regard it is worth noting that much of what is subpoenaed in the typical grand jury
investigation is never actually presented to the grand jury. There is no requirement that prosecutors
show all subpoenaed materials to the grand jury, see F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL PLEADING AND
PRACTICE § 360, at 248-49 (8th ed. 1880); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 1 FED.
PRAc. & PROC. CRIM.3d § 111.1 (R 6) (1999), and since United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36
(1992), prosecutors ordinarily are not even required to present to the grand jury exculpatory evidence
in their possession. See id. at 45-47.
344 The extraordinary scope of this power and the lack of meaningful limitations lend credence
to Professor Stuntz's argument for judicial review of grand jury subpoenas under a "substantive
fourth amendment." Cf. Stuntz, supra note 18, at 842.
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assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination for
the act of producing documents could easily be overcome by granting act

of production immunity and compelling production of the requested
materials. " Such a grant of immunity, even to the target of an
investigation as in the Hubbell case, was not regarded by prosecutors as a
serious impediment to subsequent prosecution of the individual who
produced the documents.346 To fully explore the government's position

and to fully appreciate the significance of the Hubbell Court's rejection of
that position, it is helpful to review the law governing grants of "use and

derivative use immunity" to witnesses.
In Hubbell, an immunity order was entered pursuant to the
federal immunity statute,3 47 giving Webster Hubbell "use and derivative
34

use" immunity for the act of producing the subpoenaed documents.

The use and derivative use immunity given to Hubbell differs from full
345 See Henning, supra note 19, at 443; Eric Steven O'Malley, Thirtieth Annual Review of
Criminal Procedure:Introduction and Guidefor Users: IlL Trial:Fifth Amendment at Trial, 89 GEo.
L.J. 1598, 1610 (2001).
346 At oral argument in Hubbell, the attorneys representing both the Office of Independent
Counsel, which had brought the prosecution, and the Department of Justice, which submitted an
amicus brief in support of the Independent Counsel, argued that the grant of immunity to Hubbell for
the act of producing the documents, which they admitted were used to prepare the indictment against
him, should not preclude his subsequent prosecution. The attorney representing the Independent
Counsel asserted that the grant of immunity should only "prevent us from introducing into evidence
or using in our investigation the fact that Mr. Hubbell possessed these documents." 2000 WL
230520 (U.S. Oral Arg.) at 15. Counsel for the Department of Justice conceded that after granting
immunity the government also could not make use of "the mental act that the witness uses to
correlate documents with a subpoena." Id. at 19; see also id. at 4 ("ln this particular case and I
think in most cases where you have a production of documents, you have to distinguish between the
things that the witness is forced to say, implicitly or explicitly-and in this case, I think those things
were much the same-and the contents of the documents. And in this case-and I think in many
cases-we don't have to use and we didn't use in any way any of the things that he said. I mean, all
we're using is the information that was in the documents. I think the-the key for us to this case is
that it's not relevant that we got the documents."); id. at 18 ("Mhe Government has to show that it
does not use anything testimonial in the investigation that leads up to the prosecution."); id. at 22 ("If
we show that we made no use whatsoever of any of the act of production, but only the contents of the
records, that's fine."). The Independent Counsel and the Department of Justice took similar positions
in the briefs they submitted to the Court. See 1999 WL 1072535 at 11-12 (OIC brief) ("The
compelled testimonial communication implicit in an act of production does not taint the otherwise
unprivileged, voluntarily created, pre-existing contents of the documents produced. This is the case
whenever the government makes investigative use of the contents of documents compelled under 18
U.S.C. § 6002 but does not need to rely on a defendant's testimonial communication to prove his
possession 6f the documents, the existence of the documents or their authenticity."); 1999 WL
230520 at 13 (DOJ amicus brief) ("The government's possession of subpoenaed documents, and its
consequent ability to make investigative and evidentiary use of their contents, is the result of the
purely physical aspects of respondent's act of production, not the fruit of any compelled testimony.").
Ultimately, as discussed in more detail below, the Court rejected these arguments and concluded that
a grant of immunity for the act of producing documents has much greater ramifications for
subsequent prosecution of the individual who is granted immunity.
347 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6003 (2000).
348 See United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 563 (1999), aff'd., 530 U.S. 27 (2000). See
generally Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) (upholding the constitutionality of use and
derivative use immunity grants to compel testimony).
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"transactional" immunity, which would have prevented the government
from prosecuting Hubbell for any crimes related to the information
obtained through the immunity grant. 349 For much of our history, the
assumption was that a valid assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination could be overcome only by a grant of full
transactional immunity, which would prohibit subsequent prosecution of
the witness asserting the privilege. In 1892, the Supreme Court reviewed
a challenge to an 1868 immunity statute that provided an immunized
witness protection only from the "use" of immunized testimony.35 ° In
Counselman v. Hitchcock,3 5' the Court rejected this "use" immunity as
failing to provide protection adequate to override a defendant's Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 5 2 Broad language in
Counselman5 3 suggested that transactional immunity was the only means
by which the government could constitutionally overcome a witness's
assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege. " In any event, as the
Hubbell Court subsequently observed, a grant of use immunity "was
plainly deficient in its failure to prohibit the use against the immunized
witness of evidence derived from his compelled testimony.",15
In 1893, Congress passed a "transactional" immunity statute in
response to the Counselman decision. By providing that "no person shall
be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account
of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may testify, or
produce evidence, documentary or otherwise," 35 6 the new statute gave an
immunized witness full transactional immunity from prosecution. This
statute remained in place until 1970, 357 when Congress enacted 18 U.S.C.

349 See generally BEALE ET AL., supra note 8, at § 7-3 (explaining the difference between
transactional immunity and use and derivative use immunity). The Independent Counsel could have
given Hubbell full transactional immunity had he wished, and in fact later did so in a celebrated

instance involving another witness, Monica Lewinsky.

See generally JULIE R. O'SULLIVAN,

FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS 823-24 (2001) (reprinting immunity

agreement between Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr and Monica S. Lewinsky).
350 See Act of Feb. 25, 1868.
351 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
352 See id. at 585-86.
353 "In view of the [Fifth Amendment] constitutional provision, a statutory enactment, to be
valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offence to which the question
relates." Id. at 585-86.
354 Professor Uviller has called Counselman a "decision that was universally misread for
eighty years to require 'transactional' immunity (true immunity against future prosecution) until the
nation was set straight by Kastigarv. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972)." Uviller, supra note 23,
at 319 n.33.
355 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 39 n.21 (2000).
356 See Act of Feb. 11, 1893; see also R. S. Ghio, The Iran-Contra Prosecutions and the
Failureof Use Immunity, 45 STAN. L. REv. 229, 237 (1992).
357 During this period, Congress enacted more that fifty federal immunity statutes, all of
which provided full transactional immunity. See BEALE ET AL., supra note 8, at § 7:5 & n. 10 (citing
NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS 1444-45 (1970)).
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§§ 6002 and 6003, which provide only use and derivative use immunity
and therefore "dol[ not 'afford [the] absolute immunity against future
prosecution' referred to in Counselman."35
In 1972, the Supreme Court decided Kastigar v. United States35 9
and approved the use and derivative use immunity provided by the new
federal statute as "coextensive with the privilege against selfincrimination.""36 The Court's reasoning turned on its conception of the
extent of the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment:
While a grant of immunity must afford protection commensurate
with that afforded by the privilege, it need not be broader.
Transactional immunity, which affords full immunity from prosecution
for the offense to which the compelled testimony relates, affords the
witness considerably broader protection than does the Fifth Amendment
privilege. The privilege has never been construed to mean that one who
invokes it cannot subsequently be prosecuted .... Immunity from the
use of compelled testimony, as well as evidence derived directly and
indirectly therefrom, affords this protection.
It prohibits the
prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled testimony in any
respect, and it therefore insures that the testimony cannot lead to the
infliction of criminal penalties on the witness.361
By permitting subsequent prosecution of an immunized witness,
Kastigarappeared to have altered the balance of power between witnesses
who asserted their privilege against self-incrimination with respect to their
testimony and prosecutors who were seeking that testimony but did not
wish to forego all opportunity to prosecute the witness who possessed the
information.362
The extent of the change brought about by Kastigar's approval of
the use and derivative use immunity statute ultimately was tempered by
the difficulty of proving that the prosecution had made no improper use of
the immunized testimony. In United States v. North,363 the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit analyzed the heavy
burden that the prosecution bears under Kastigarif it seeks to prosecute a
previously immunized witness. The court defined impermissible use of
358 See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 452. See generally Ghio, supra note 356, at 238; John Van
Loben Sels, From Watergate to Whitewater: Congressional Use Immunity and Its Impact on the
Independent Counsel, 83 GEO. L.J. 2385, 2388-89 (1995); Leonard N. Sosnov, Separationof Powers
Shell Game: The FederalWitness Immunity Act, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 171, 184-86 (2000).
359 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
360 Id. at 453. Some commentators have criticized this conclusion, and continue to advocate
for a return to transactional immunity. Ghio, supra note 356, at 251-52.
361 Kastigar,406 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
362 See generally Amar & Lettow, supra note 28, at 877-79.
363 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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immunized testimony broadly, concluding that "the use of immunized
testimony by witnesses to refresh their memories, or otherwise to focus
their thoughts, organize their testimony, or alter their prior or
contemporaneous statements, constitutes evidentiary use," and therefore,
requires a Kastigar hearing. 3" This broad definition of what constitutes
an unconstitutional "use" of immunized testimony presents a significant
obstacle to prosecution of a previously immunized witness.365 The D.C.
Circuit left little doubt that the test will be a difficult one for the
prosecution to meet:
That inquiry must proceed witness-by-witness; if
necessary, it will proceed line-by-line and item-by-item. For
each grand jury and trial witness, the prosecution must show by
a preponderance of the evidence that no use whatsoever was
made of any of the immunized testimony either by the witness
or by the [prosecution] in questioning the witness.366
Finally, the North court made clear that a failure to meet this test would
require either a new trial or, in the case of grand jury evidence, dismissal
of the indictment.36
North was not a typical criminal case, and commentators differ as
to its overall impact. While some commentators believe that North
effectively restored transactional immunity,3 6 others view it as a special
case involving an unusually high-profile investigation that created special
problems for post-use immunity grant prosecution. 369 Even though not all
federal courts have adopted the "super-strict" approach of North,37 there
is no doubt that the case provides a powerful example of the difficulty the
government faces under Kastigar when it seeks to prosecute an
immunized witness.371

364 Id. at 856.
365 See Ghio, supra note 356, at 255 (praising the court in North for interpreting Kastigarin a

fashion that effectively restores transactional immunity). But see Jerome A. Murphy, The Aftermath
of the Iran-ContraTrials: The Uncertain Status of Derivative Use Immunity, 51 MD. L. Rv. 1011,
1050-53 (1992) (criticizing the court in North for unnecessarily expanding the scope of Kastigar,and
for effectively re-instating transactional immunity at least in high-publicity cases).
366 North, 910 F.2d at 872.
367 Id. at 872-73.
368 See Ghio, supra note 356, at 237.
369 See Murphy, supra note 363, 1052-53 (suggesting that North could be limited to highpublicity cases).
370 See Amar & Lettow, supra note 28, at 879 (describing the D.C. Circuit's North approach
as "super-strict" and noting that other circuits "have diverged from a super-strict approach, and with
good reason").
371 See generally Ronald F. Wright, CongressionalUse of Immunity GrantsAfter Iran-Contra,
80 MINN. L. REv. 407, 409 (1995).
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Hubbell Raises the Stakes for Act of Production Immunity
Grants.

The Hubbell case provides important new guidance on an area of
criminal law that can be described as the intersection of Fisher and North.
Even after North, few prosecutors (and perhaps few judges) regarded the
act of production privilege recognized in Fisher as presenting the same
potential for complex Kastigar hearings as immunized testimony. 3' We
now know that the Supreme Court views the matter differently. Hubbell
demonstrates that the Kastigartest must be applied with the same vigor
whether the immunized testimony is in the form of the act of producing
documents or the act of providing oral testimony. Just as North and cases
like it have made prosecutors extremely wary of giving even use and
derivative use immunity to potential subjects or targets of criminal
investigations, Hubbell is likely to make prosecutors hesitate before
immunizing an act of production of documents by a potential subject or
target. The obvious question that follows from that result is what will
prosecutors do? How will they seek to obtain documents from such
individuals? Part V of this Article addresses these questions.
V.

Prosecutorial Efforts to Obtain Private Papers from Individuals
After Hubbell.

Read together, the D.C. Circuit's Hubbell opinion analyzing the
act of production doctrine and the Supreme Court's opinion affirming the
D.C. Circuit promise to have a major impact on Fifth Amendment law.
To understand the full impact of the Hubbell case, it is helpful to examine
both the explicit practical questions that the Supreme Court's opinion
answers and the implicit theoretical questions that the opinion raises.
A.

The Broad Reach of the Supreme Court's Holding in Hubbell.

The clearest points from Hubbell are the arguments that were
rejected by both the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court. Both courts
firmly and decisively rejected the government's argument that the act of
production doctrine should apply only to the physical act of production,
and therefore, the doctrine could be satisfied by treating the subpoenaed
documents as "manna from heaven" that appeared as if by magic on the

372 The immunized testimony at issue in North was provided to congressional committees, not

to a grand jury or at a criminal trial, see North, 910 F.2d 843, but that distinction is not important
because the same immunity statute and constitutional provisions were at issue.
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grand jury table. 373 The government pressed this argument 4 because it
minimizes the protection afforded by the act of production privilege. The

government had argued that the act of production doctrine protected only
the physical act of compelled production, and the production of
documents was analogous to forcing a witness to surrender the key to a

strongbox.

375

The conclusion of this argument was that the government

can use evidence contained in the strongbox against the witness who
surrendered the key, and by analogy, the government should be able to
use the contents of the documents against the witness who produced them.

The Supreme Court dismissed this "anemic view" of the act of production
as "a mere physical act" as failing to account for the realities of the
communicative aspects of producing documents in response to a
subpoena. 376 The Court concluded that the mental efforts required by a
witness to assemble and produce subpoenaed documents was like

testifying to the combination to a wall safe, not like physically
surrendering the key to a strongbox.37 7
This is the first and most basic question that the Hubbell case
answers: What is the nature of the act of production? The Court said in
the clearest possible terms that the act of producing documents in

response to a subpoena is not merely a physical act; it also may be a
testimonial communication that imparts information. For that reason, the

government cannot overcome an assertion of the act of production
privilege merely by making no reference to the physical act of
production. This part of the Hubbell opinion should permanently put to

373 See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 42 (2000); United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d
552, 583 (1999), aff'd., 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
374 See 1999 WL 1076136 at 25 (DOJ amicus brief) ("Under Judge Alito's approach, the grant
of use immunity should place the government in the same position that it would occupy if the
documents had 'materializ[ed] in the grand jury room as if by magic before a subpoena has been
issued'-i.e., the position it would occupy if the government 'ha[d] the records but [had] no idea
where they came from and no information about the meaning of the records except what could be
learned from the records themselves.' Judge Alito explained that '[t]his image is helpful because it
allows us to separate the contents of the records from any evidence, direct or circumstantial,
concerning their production.' That analysis is correct.") (citing Alito, supranote 8, at 60).
375 See 2000 WL 230520 at 9 (U.S. Oral Argument of Ronald J. Mann) ("And so, if we make
him tell us the combination to the safe, if we make him tell us the information we want, well, then we
lose. But if what we do is we force him to the physical act of handing it to us, that's permissible.").
376 See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43. In contrast, this "anemic" view of the Fifth Amendment
seems to have been endorsed by both Judge Williams, who dissented from the Fifth Amendment
portion of the D.C. Circuit's Hubbell opinion, see Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 552, 597 (dissenting from
Part II of the opinion), and Chief Justice Rehnquist, who dissented from the Supreme Court's Hubbell
opinion, see Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 49 (dissenting "for the reasons given by Judge Williams in his
dissenting opinion"). One commentator has taken the side of the dissenters and argued that Hubbell
was wrongly decided by the Court. See Uviller, supra note 23, at 311.
377 See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43.
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rest the "manna from heaven" conception of the act of production
privilege.37
The Hubbell case also lays to rest a second government argument
that would have minimized the protection provided by the act of
production privilege. Even if the act of production is inherently
testimonial and communicative, as the Hubbell Court confirned, under
Fisher it can be overcome if the information that is communicated
through the act of production is a "foregone conclusion." 7 The
government argued that any time business and financial records are
subpoenaed, the foregone conclusion doctrine should apply because it is
reasonable to assume that anyone engaged in business keeps some such
records.380 If accepted, this argument would mean that a witness could
not assert an act of production privilege with respect to business and
financial documents, or else a court would be required to reject the
witness's assertion of privilege if the government moved to compel
production. The end result would be that the production of the very kind
of documents which are subpoenaed in most white-collar crime
investigations (business and financial records) would never be subject to
Fifth Amendment protection. Although production of other kinds of
documents, such as diaries and personal writings, might still be protected
by the privilege, the "ordinary business records" exception would
essentially swallow the act of production privilege rule announced in
Fisher.
This is the second question that the Hubbell case answers: Are
business and financial records presumptively subject to the foregone
conclusion doctrine? The Court answered this question by rejecting the
"overbroad argument that a businessman such as [Hubbell] will always
possess general business and tax records." 381 This part of the Hubbell
378 Professor Uviller has described the "manna from heaven" analysis that was rejected in
Hubbell as "precisely how I have taught the law of implicit self-incrimination by compliance with a
subpoena duces tecum." Uviller, supra note 23, at 311. He goes on to say that his "clear

understanding of the Fisher doctrine is exactly what was rejected by the Supreme Court," id. at 312,
and concludes that the Court's decision in Hubbell was wrongly decided, see id. at 335. Such a
strong condemnation of the outcome might be unremarkable in response to a closely divided in a 5-4
Supreme Court decision, but in a nearly unanimous 7-1 decision, it serves to highlight the
significance of what the Court decided in Hubbell and how dramatically the Court has departed from
the conventional understanding of the Fisheract of production doctrine.

379 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976).
380 See 1999 WL 1072535 at 10-11 (OIC brief) ("This case, like Fisher,involves a subpoena
that seeks production of typical and customary business records (including tax and bank account
records), which the government naturally would expect a businessman, like respondent, to maintain.

Under Fisher, respondent's production of such ordinary business records is not sufficiently
testimonial to implicate the Fifth Amendment."); 1999 WL 1076136 at 11 (DOJ amicus brief) ("An
implicit admission of possession of ordinary financial documents does not rise to the level of a

testimonial communication under the Fifth Amendment.').
381 See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 45.
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opinion should permanently put to rest the "ordinary business records"
foregone conclusion argument.
B.

The Fifth Amendment Analytical Framework Mandated by
Hubbell.

The explicit rejection of these two arguments leaves unanswered
the fundamental question of when the foregone conclusion doctrine
applies. The D.C. Circuit answered this question by articulating the
reasonable particularity test, 382 but the Supreme Court declined to adopt
that test. 3 3 The Court went only so far as to say that the government
must show prior knowledge of the existence and location of the
subpoenaed documents. 3" Although this guidance from the Court may
not answer the question of whether the foregone conclusion doctrine
should apply in a particular situation-how much prior knowledge is
enough?-it is sufficient to establish the analytical framework for postHubbell Fifth Amendment document production cases. That framework
consists of three distinct inquiries, defined by the D.C. Circuit and
Supreme Court opinions in the Hubbell case.
Phase One - Assessing the Testimonial Value of the Act
of Production.

1.

Phase one of the act of production analysis is the Fisher/Doe I
inquiry into whether the act of production has sufficient testimonial value
to be protected by the Fifth Amendment or, stated differently, whether
the testimonial information that would be conveyed is a "foregone
conclusion" because the government has "prior knowledge" of that
information.385 Several points concerning this judicial inquiry are clear
after Hubbell. First, the burden is on the government to show prior
knowledge. Second, the argument that existence and possession of
"ordinary business records" can be presumed, thus relieving the
government of its burden to show prior knowledge, can no longer be
asserted. Third, if the government requires assistance from the witness in
identifying and assembling the documents that are subject to the
subpoena, then it cannot meet its prior knowledge burden. The only
significant question left unanswered by the Supreme Court in Hubbell is
how the courts should decide a close case in which the government has
382 See supra Part II.A.3.
383
384
385
existence

See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 45.
Id.
See id. ("mhe government has not shown that it had any prior knowledge of either the
or the whereabouts [of the subpoenaed documents.]").
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some prior knowledge but the witness asserts an act of production
privilege and declines to produce the subpoenaed documents. Future
development of the case law should answer this question, as the lower
courts decide whether to adopt the D.C. Circuit's "reasonable
particularity" test-and nothing in the Supreme Court's Hubbell opinion
suggests they should not do so-or develop alternative tests.
If the government can satisfy the prior knowledge requirement,
then a court should grant a motion to compel and require production of
the subpoenaed documents. The government is most likely to be able to
meet this requirement when it is subpoenaing a limited number of
specifically described documents, as opposed to broad categories of
documents, and it has evidence that those documents exist and are in the
possession or control of the witness. The broader and more general the
subpoena, the less likely it will be that the government can satisfy the
prior knowledge requirement. This aspect of Hubbell alone has enormous
ramifications for white collar criminal enforcement. Careful prosecutors
are likely to stop relying on the kind of broad, all-encompassing,
boilerplate document subpoenas that have become a staple of white-collar
practice, at least in cases where an individual rather than a collective
entity is being subpoenaed. Moreover, as discussed below, prosecutors
may be more likely to obtain a search warrant and seize the documents,
rather than issue a subpoena, perhaps hoping that a search will lead to
other evidence that would not have been produced in response to a
subpoena.
If these changes occur, then the Hubbell case will have
significantly influenced criminal law investigation and enforcement. The
use of broad "fishing expedition" document subpoenas will be curtailed,
and investigations will be more focused. Significant resources, on both
the prosecution and defense sides, that now are devoted to document
review, collection, organization, and production, will be freed up. The
costs of conducting and defending investigations will be reduced.
Prosecutors should be able to investigate more cases, and defense costs
should be reduced for targets and subjects of grand jury investigations.
Both of these developments potentially could reduce the number of plea
bargain agreements, at least in marginal cases. The government may
have more resources available to try cases, and defendants may be better
able to bear the costs of trial if their resources have been less drained by
responding to broad document subpoenas and addressing the issues
presented by documents produced in response to those subpoenas. It is
difficult to predict the degree to which any of these possible outcomes
ultimately will occur, but they have the potential to bring real change to
the conduct of white collar criminal investigations.
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Phase Two - Determining Whether the Act of Production is

Incriminating.
The possible changes discussed above all flow from first phase of

the post-Hubbell act of production analysis: the reinvigorated Fisher/Doe
I foregone conclusion inquiry. The second phase of the Fifth Amendment
act of production judicial review process arises when the government
cannot meet the prior knowledge requirement. Both the D.C. Circuit 86

and Supreme Cour t 87 opinions in the Hubbell case make clear that even if
existence and possession is not a foregone conclusion, a court still must
inquire into whether the testimonial component of the act of producing

documents in fact is incriminating.

If the information that is

communicated by the act of production (e.g., the existence, location, and

authenticity of the documents produced) "would furnish a link in the
chain of evidence needed to prosecute the [witness,]" then the privilege
should be upheld.388 Although neither court analyzed this issue in great
detail,38 9 both opinions clearly contemplate a judicial assessment of the

incrimination issue.
This "phase two" judicial inquiry into whether the testimonial
component of the act of production is incriminating should not be
confused with the separate inquiry into whether the act of production has
sufficient testimonial value to be protected by the Fifth Amendment. The
latter seeks to determine whether the act of production communicates

sufficient information to be testimonial. If the answer to that question is
affirmative, the court still must determine whether the testimonial
information that would be provided by the act of production is in fact
incriminating (whether directly or indirectly). In most cases, as the
Hubbell opinions suggest, the testimony inherent in the act of production
386 See United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 581-82 (1999), aff'd., 530 U.S. 27 (2000)
(analyzing authorities on when testimonial communications are sufficiently incriminatory to implicate
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
387 See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 38 (discussing the Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479
(1951), test for determining when compelled testimony is incriminating and citing Doe v. United
States, 487 U.S. 201, 208 n.6 (1988) [hereinafter Doe fl], for the proposition that "[c]ompelled
testimony that communicates information that may 'lead to incriminating evidence' is privileged even
if the information itself is not inculpatory").
388 See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 38 (quoting Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486).
389 While the D.C. Circuit observed that "it appears that Hubbell's testimony likely involved
both direct and indirect incrimination," Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 582, it left the incrimination inquiry for
the district court to resolve on remand, see id. ("[lt would be premature for us to review the
incrimination question any further at this juncture."). The Supreme Court reviewed relevant
authorities on the question of when testimony is incriminatory, see Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 38, but did
not apply those authorities directly to the facts of Hubbell and seems to have viewed the incrimination
element as self-evident, see id. at 45 ("Given our conclusion that respondent's act of production had a
testimonial aspect, at least with respect to the existence and location of the documents sought by the
Government's subpoena, respondent could not be compelled to produce those document without first
receiving a grant of immunity ....
).
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will be incriminating, but this inquiry does provide a judicially controlled
"safety valve" for dismissing frivolous or unwarranted claims of
privilege.3"

3.

Phase Three - The KastigarUse and Derivative
Use Immunity Inquiry.
The final step in the act of production analysis mandated by

Hubbell is the Kastigar immunity inquiry.

If a court answers the two

questions above in the affirmative, finding that an act of production of
documents is both testimonial and incriminating, then the court will

uphold a witness's assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination and
will not grant a motion to compel production by the prosecution. In that
situation, the prosecution still can overcome the witness's assertion of the

Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and obtain the
subpoenaed documents by granting the witness immunity.

If the

prosecution grants use and derivative use immunity for the act of
production, it can obtain the documents, as it did in Hubbell, but in doing
so it may forfeit the opportunity to prosecute the witness who produces
the documents. The Supreme Court in Hubbell left no question that if
immunity is granted, the government must meet the heavy Kastigar

390 On rare occasions courts have concluded that an assertion of the privilege against selfincrimination as frivolous or unwarranted. See, e.g., Steinbrecher v. Commissioner, 712 F.2d 195,
197-98 (5th Cir. 1983) ("The taxpayers' argument that they were entitled to rely on the fifth
amendment in refusing to file adequate returns and to comply with the orders of the Tax Court is
frivolous. The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination protects an individual from being
compelled to disclose information that could reasonably be expected to furnish evidence needed to
prosecute the claimant for a crime. It, therefore, applies only when the possibility of selfincrimination is a real danger, not a remote and speculative possibility. The claimant must be faced
with substantial hazards of incrimination from the information sought, and: 'The witness is not
exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in doing so he would incriminate
himself-his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It is for the court to say
whether his silence is justified.'") (internal citations omitted); McCoy v. Commissioner, 696 F.2d
1234, 1236 (9th Cir. 1983) ("The McCoys may not invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self incrimination to justify their refusal to comply with discovery. A valid Fifth Amendment
objection may be raised only to questions which present a 'real and appreciable danger of selfincrimination.' If the threat is remote, unlikely, or speculative, the privilege does not apply, and
while the claimant need not incriminate himself in order to invoke the privilege, if the circumstances
appear to be innocuous, he must make some 'positive disclosure' indicating where the danger lies.
The McCoys flatly refused to justify his fear of criminal prosecution. Their Fifth Amendment claim
therefore must be rejected.") (internal citations omitted).
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burden. 39' As discussed above, 39 in most cases it will be exceedingly
393
difficult for the government to make the showing required by Kastigar.
C. How Will Hubbell Affect the Investigation of White Collar Crime?
Does this mean that Hubbell will effectively preclude the
government from obtaining documents from an individual and
subsequently prosecuting that individual? The answer to that question
might be closer to "yes" if the only means of obtaining documents
available to the prosecution was to compel production by issuing a
subpoena duces tecum. That is not the case, however, because the
prosecution has an alternative means of obtaining documents; it can seek
to obtain a search warrant and seize the documents itself. This alternative
raises no Fifth Amendment issue because there is no act of production
and, thus, no "testimony," by the individual who possesses the
documents. This is the second major potential impact of Hubbell:
prosecutors may use search warrants in many cases where they previously
would have issued subpoenas.
Whether or not Hubbell will make search warrant more attractive
to prosecutors than subpoenas duces tecum in white collar criminal
investigations is a difficult question. Prosecutors still must persuade a
neutral magistrate that the Fourth Amendment's probable cause and
particularity requirements are satisfied before the warrant will be issued.
In the past, prosecutors were able to avoid meeting these requirements by
issuing a subpoena to the individual they believed might have possession
or control of the evidence they were seeking. Even if the subpoenaed
witness asserted the act of production privilege, the prosecutor could
overcome the privilege by granting act of production immunity. The
contents of the subpoenaed documents could then be used in the
investigation and prosecution of the witness. After Hubbell, however,
prosecutors who take the subpoena approach may face a burden that is
391 See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 45 ("Kastigarrequires that respondent's motion to dismiss the
indictment on immunity grounds be granted unless the government proves that the evidence it used in
obtaining the indictment and proposed to use at trial was derived from legitimate sources 'wholly
independent' of the testimonial aspect of respondent's immunized conduct in assembling and
producing the documents described in the subpoena.").

392 See supra Part IV.C.
393 The Supreme Court appears to have recognized this point when it rejected the Independent
Counsel's argument in Hubbell that the witness should be required to make a showing that "there is

some substantial relationship between the compelled testimonial communications implicit in the act of
production (as opposed to the act of production standing alone) and some aspect of information used

in the investigation or the evidence presented at trial." Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 45 (quoting from the
Office of Independent Counsel's Brief for United States at 9). In the words of the Court: "We could
not accept this submission without repudiating the basis for our conclusion in Kastigar that the
statutory guarantee of use and derivative use immunity is as broad as the constitutional privilege
itself. This we are not prepared to do." Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 45-46.
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comparable to that presented by the probable cause and particularity
requirements for obtaining a search warrant.
If the courts that apply Hubbell follow the D.C. Circuit approach
and impose a "reasonable particularity" requirement 94 for making a
Fisher/Doeforegone conclusion showing, then the requirement will differ
little from the Fourth Amendment particularity requirement for obtaining
a search warrant. Even if the Hubbell Supreme Court opinion's less
demanding standard of "prior knowledge of either the existence or
whereabouts"395 of documents is employed, the standard is similar to the
Fourth Amendment particularity standard. "'
Although further
development of the case law will be required to determine precisely how
Hubbell's Fifth Amendment act of production "foregone conclusion"
standard overlaps the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement, it is
likely that in many cases a prosecutor who could satisfy one test could

also satisfy the other. 3"
The other Fourth Amendment requirement for obtaining a search
warrant-probable cause-may present a greater hurdle for prosecutors in
cases where a search warrant is being considered as an alternative to a
subpoena duces tecum. The probable cause requirement may be difficult
to meet in those white collar criminal investigations where, at least
initially, the purpose of the investigation is to determine whether a crime

has been committed."9
less significant.

After Hubbell, however, the difference may be

40
Both the Supreme Court399 and the D.C. Circuit

opinions in Hubbell contemplate that a witness asserting an act of
production privilege must be able to demonstrate that the compelled
testimony in fact would be incriminating before a court will conclude that
the testimony merits Fifth Amendment protection.40 ' If a witness can
make this showing, then in many cases a prosecutor also would be able to
394 Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 579.
395 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 45.
396 See supra Part III.A.
397 This is particularly true in jurisdictions where courts apply a less strict particularity
requirement in case involving complex white-collar crimes. See supra note 316.
398 See Stuntz, supra note 18, at 860 ("The government may be able to generate enough
evidence to raise some suspicion, but the evidence (and the suspicion) will often be weak until
witnesses have been called and documents examined. Thus, a probable cause standard for subpoenas
would end many grand jury investigations before they had begun.").
399 See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 37-38 (noting that Fifth Amendment protection extends to
information that may lead to incriminating evidence).
400 See United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 581-82 (1999), aff'd., 530 U.S. 27 (2000)
(finding Fifth Amendment protection for threats of incriminating responses).
401 Both courts cited the Hoffman test for when testimony is sufficiently incriminating to
justify invocation of the privilege. Compare Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 38 and Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 581.
Under Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951), and its progeny, a court must conclude that
there is a "real and substantial" risk that the testimony might expose the witness to criminal liability
in order to uphold the witness's invocation of the privilege. See BEALE ET AL., supra note 8, § 7:2 at
7-7 n.2 (collecting cases).
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demonstrate probable cause. In the remaining cases, a prosecutor may be
unable to obtain a warrant, and Hubbell may make the use of an

immunity grant to overcome the act of production privilege unattractive.
This is not to say that an investigation could not go forward in those
cases. If prosecutors were initially unable to meet that burden, they may
have to defer obtaining documents from the target of the investigation
until they have developed additional evidence from other sources, such as
associates or employees of the target. 2
Although the Fourth Amendment probable cause requirement for
obtaining a search warrant may be a greater obstacle than the Hubbell

foregone conclusion "prior knowledge" requirement, prosecutors who
have prior knowledge that is sufficient to meet the latter test often will
also be able to meet Fourth Amendment probable cause and particularity
requirements and obtain a search warrant.4 3 This means that, after

Hubbell, prosecutors may obtain search warrants in cases-perhaps many
cases-where they previously would have issued a subpoena duces tecum.

VI.

Conclusion
Hubbell has, at least in practical effect, overruled Fisher and

restored full, meaningful (as opposed to "act of production") Fifth
Amendment protection to most private papers in the possession of an
individual. After Hubbell, prosecutors are no longer free to use the
contents of documents to prosecute a witness after they have immunized

that witness's act of producing those documents. If prosecutors can show
402 Although Professor William J. Stuntz is probably correct that "a probable cause standard
for subpoena would end many white-collar criminal investigations before they had begun," see
Stuntz, supra note 18, at 860, many other white-collar investigations would go forward. It also may
be that many of those that were stymied by an inability to compel a target to produce documents or to
obtain a search warrant for documents were "fishing expeditions" in which the prosecution had no
good reason to believe a crime even had been committed.
403 Another commentator has recognized that Hubbell is likely to alter the subpoena
versus search warrant calculus in white-collar criminal investigations:
Last Term, in United States v. Hubbell, the Supreme Court
appeared to conclude that unless the government knows-really
knows-of a particular document's existence, a subpoena's target is
free to refuse to turn the document over, because the act of
producing the document would testify to the fact that it does indeed
exist. Of course, if the government really does know that the
document exists, and hence knows what is in it (knowledge of
contents tends to track knowledge of existence), the government can
probably get a warrant to search for and seize the document. Thus,
after Hubbell, the working rule will be something like the following:
When faced with subpoenas for documents, suspects can comply or
not as they wish. For its part, the government can search for the
evidence it wants, so long as it satisfies the probable cause and
warrant requirements.
Stuntz, supra note 18, at 865.
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prior knowledge of the existence, location, and authenticity of the
documents, then the act of production has no testimonial value, and a
court must reject a witness's assertion of an act of production privilege.
In that case, the prosecution can obtain the documents without an
immunity grant and is free to use both the act of production and the
contents of the documents to prosecute the witness.
What remains of Fisher after Hubbell? Everything or nothing,
depending on the case. The distinction between the contents of
documents and the act of producing documents remains viable, but the
significance of that distinction will vary based upon what knowledge the
prosecution has when it seeks to compel production of documents. If the
government can show prior knowledge of the existence, location, and
authenticity of the documents, as it did in Fisher, then the act of
production privilege is not available to the witness. In those cases, the
Fisher distinction between contents and the act of production remains
valid because the government need not show any knowledge of the
contents of the documents. For example, if the government can show that
it knows the witness keeps a diary and that the diary is in the witness's
possession, then the government can compel production, even if the
government has no idea what the diary says. On the other hand, if the
government lacks knowledge of whether the witness possesses a particular
document or class of documents and is merely engaged in a "fishing
expedition," then a witness can assert the act of production privilege, and
the three-step, post-Hubbell act of production analysis applies. In those
cases, little, if anything, remains of the Fisher distinction between
contents and the act of production.
What is the bottom line? If a document is in the possession of an
individual witness (as opposed to a collective entity) and is truly private
(in that others, including the government, do not know either that the
document exists or the witness possesses it), then after Hubbell, that
document is fully protected by the Fifth Amendment; in other words, if
the witness produces the document pursuant to a grant of use and
derivative use immunity, then neither the physical act of production of the
document nor the contents of the document can be used against the
witness in a subsequent prosecution. This result arguably is more like the
holding of Boyd than that of Fisher. In this regard, the application of the
Fifth Amendment to an individual's private papers may have returned
very nearly to the level of protection that Boyd was understood to
provide. It remains to be seen whether this new protection promised by
Hubbell will be implemented or cut back by the lower federal courts, but
it is clear that the seed has been sown for a new interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment's application to an individual's private papers. Contrary to
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Justice O'Connor's broad statement in Doe 1, 404 it appears that, after
Hubbell, the Fifth Amendment provides at least some protection, albeit
indirect, for the contents of private papers.

404 "[The Fifth Amendment provides absolutely no protection for the contents of private
papers of any kind." United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 618 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).

